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This thesis considers the effects of cyber operations on kinetic warfare, by exploring and 
building on two recently proposed extensions to traditional Lanchester models of combat. 
In one model, we consider instantaneous changes to kinetic fighting capability resulting, 
for example, from the disruption or restoration of communications or other supporting 
cyber systems. Such changes create discontinuous shocks in the overall combat dynamics 
and can dramatically affect the outcome of a battle. In the second model, we represent 
cyber operations as a continuous process of degradation and recovery in fighting 
capability based on the dynamics of epidemic spread. By using analytical and numerical 
approaches, we obtain insights about the effect of cyber operations on battle duration and 
attrition, how cyber operations can affect victory conditions, and tradeoffs in the 
allocation of limited resources to cyber operations and kinetic operations. Building on a 
common model framework, we develop several additional models that can be used to 
investigate specific aspects of cyber operations on kinetic combat. 
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“Cyber operations” is topic of increasing importance to the United States and countries 
all over the world. The impacts of cyber operations on conventional kinetic battles are an 
area of interest. These operations can be used to decrease fighting capabilities of an 
adversary. And unlike the study of traditional warfare, there are no well-accepted models 
for these phenomena. But, the mathematical models for cyber operations can give 
insights that help strategic decisions to generate tactical approaches. These models can 
also be used in the efficient allocation of resources. 
This thesis is based on Lanchester equations as the main model of combat. 
Specifically, we build upon two recent efforts that use modified versions of Lanchester 
equations to study the effect of cyber operations on kinetic battles. In this representation, 
a cyber attack does not kill an adversary, but it affects fighting capability as represented 
by the attrition coefficients in the model. The cyber attacker benefits from this action by 
decreasing the attrition rate of self.  
The first model builds on the work of Schramm (2012), in which instantaneous 
changes to kinetic fighting capability result from, for example, the disruption or 
restoration of communications or other supporting cyber systems. Such changes create 
discontinuous shocks in the overall combat dynamics and can dramatically affect the 
outcome of a battle. We consider a model in which one side suffers a first shock that 
degrades fighting capability and then another shock that restores it. We explore the 
impact of timing, duration, and magnitude of the shock on the overall battle outcome. 
The second model follows the work of Schramm and Gaver (2013), in which the 
dynamics of combat are mixed with the dynamics of epidemic spread. Here, cyber 
operations are represented as a continuous process of degradation and recovery in 
fighting capability. Again, the analysis focuses on the rate of spread and recovery and its 
impact on battle outcome. 
The main difference between these two models is that, the first one considers a 
cyber attack at an instant of time, while the second model considers the effect of the 
xi 
cyber attack as a process evolving over time. Both of these assumptions have different 
applications and capture different aspects of cyber operations.  
In this study, we also propose various extensions to studied models, such as 
adding different intrusion times, defense capabilities or adding a second type of infection 
to the system. These proposed models are intended to represent different aspects of cyber 
operations, and serve as a basis for future work in this area. 
xii 
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“Cyber” is a new term in our lives, a term that is changing business, social 
relations, politics, and art as well as security-related topics. The use of the prefix “cyber” 
was first popularized by Norbert Wiener (1965) through his book Cybernetics, or Control 
and Communication in the Animal and the Machine. More recently, this prefix has been 
associated broadly with the interface between man and machine. The Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary defines cyber as “of, relating to, or involving computers or computer networks 
(as the Internet).”  
A. THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF CYBER SECURITY 
“Cyber operations” is topic of increasing importance to the United States and 
countries all over the world. Over the last several years, concerns over the effects of cyber 
security, in particular, were in the spotlight. For example: in 2008, President Bush 
launched the Comprehensive National Cyber Security Initiative. The North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (NATO CCD COE) 
was formally established in 2008 in order to enhance NATO’s cyber defense capability. In 
2009, President Obama directed a “clean slate” Cyberspace Policy Review, which 
considers “strategy, policy, and standards regarding the security of and operations in 
cyberspace, and encompasses the full range of threat reduction, vulnerability reduction, 
deterrence, international engagement, incident response, resiliency, and recovery policies 
and activities, including computer network operations, information assurance, law 
enforcement, diplomacy, military, and intelligence missions as they relate to the security 
and stability of the global information and communications infrastructure” (White House, 
2009). This review recommended keeping cyber security a top priority for the President. 
In 2010, the “Cyber domain” was declared as the fifth domain of battleground for the 
United States (Lynn, The Economist, 2010). Recently, President Obama stated cyber 
security is at the top of the list of priorities for the United States (Obama, 2013).  
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The main reason for this sharp increase in the importance of cyber-related issues is 
our increased dependency on electronics. The development of electronic devices and 
digital networks has been primarily for new functionality, convenience, and cost savings. 
In most cases security has not been an important issue in the design until there is a cyber-
related accident or an intentional breach, known as a cyber security incident. With 
increased dependency on electronics, security gaps have become even wider. 
A second reason for greater attention to cyber-related concerns is the increase in 
cyber security incidents. In 2011, Symantec reported that over 5.5 billion attacks were 
blocked, nearly 5,000 new vulnerabilities were identified, and an average breach exposed 
1.1 million identities, in computer systems all over the world (Symantec, 2012). Further, 
over 400 million unique variants of malware attempted to take advantage of those 
vulnerabilities; with the number of malware variants 40% higher than in 2010. According 
to a Symantec report in 2014, there were 215 significant incidents of identity theft in 2013 
and the average number of exposed identities increased to 1.6 million identities per 
breach. Moreover, 70% of these identities included real names, 40% included 
government-issued social security numbers, and 40% included dates of birth. According to 
the same report, there were 6436 cyber vulnerabilities identified in 2013, eight of which 
were “zero-day” vulnerabilities, meaning that they were exploited before they were known 
by cyber security managers (Symantec, 2014).  
Another reason for increased attention to cyber security is that cyber operations are 
fundamentally asymmetric. Only a small amount of resources are needed to create and 
exploit one’s cyber vulnerabilities. As noted by the Defense Science Board (2013), for as 
little as $40 up to $4,000 anyone can acquire cyber attack tools. With such a low barrier to 
entry, almost anyone can exploit any known and uncorrected vulnerabilities.  
In the current operating environment, the superiority of U.S. military systems is 
critically dependent upon increasingly vulnerable information technologies. The 
Department of Defense (DOD) seeks new techniques, procedures, and technologies to 
strengthen this link in the chain.  
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Until recently, there were no mathematical models for cyber operation effects on 
the battleground. In 2009, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security published the 
framework, A Roadmap for Cybersecurity Research, which identified 11 challenging and 
vital problems such as identity management, survivability of time critical systems, insider 
threats, and combating malware. Another well-known study, the JASON Report The 
Science of Cyber-Security (McMorrow, JASON DTIC Document, 2010) recommended 
that all types of analytical approaches should be considered, and it suggested a 
combination of models from various other sciences such as physics, biology, and 
epidemiology. In 2011, the DOD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace (DOD, 2011) 
established a conceptual framework based on five strategic initiatives, summarized as: 
treat cyberspace as an operational domain, employ new defensive concepts, enhance the 
government partnership with industry, establish partnerships with allies, invest in research 
and development.  
For a more detailed report on the commercial aspects of cyber operations see 
Sommer (2011), which discusses a report by Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) titled “Reducing Systematic Cybersecurity Risks.” For a detailed 
literature review on military concerns related to cyber operations see the report of the 
Defense Science Board in 2013 to the Department of Defense titled “Resilient Military 
Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat” (Defense Science Board, 2013).  
B. SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES OF THIS STUDY 
The objective in this thesis is to study the essence and behavior of cyber operation 
effects on combat. The scope of this study is limited to the description and exploration of 
the effects of cyber operations within kinetic battle, in order to give descriptive insights of 
the results of integrated and joint cyber operations.  
This study builds on two recent efforts to model the effects of cyber operations in 
kinetic warfare. Schramm (2012) proposes a mathematical model in Lanchester Models 
with Discontinuities: An Application to Networked Forces to represent shock effects on 
networked forces, which can be used to represent the results of cyber operations. This 
study introduces a novel twist on traditional Lanchester equations (Lanchester, 1916) 
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describing force-on-force combat. Specifically, Schramm considers a discontinuous 
“shock” that instantaneously changes attrition coefficients in the system of differential 
equations, and then assesses the impact of this change on the outcome. The shock may be 
due to a cyber attack which results in decreased effectiveness of the force being cyber 
attacked. The cyber attack affects the opposing force permanently to the end of the battle. 
This representation naturally leads to questions about the timing and degradation of 
fighting capability: how much weaker can a force become and still win? How long must a 
cyber attack be effective to result in a kinetic battle victory? 
Following this, Schramm and Gaver (2013) propose a “mixed epidemic combat 
model” that models cyber attacks as variants of biological infections, which affect the 
kinetic fighting capability of the opposing force. The basic scenario is as follows: A Red 
force kinetically attacks a Blue force while also trying to infect Blue’s electronic devices 
with a cyber attack in order to reduce Blue’s defensive power and offensive power. The 
Blue force attacks Red kinetically only, but with reduced capability because of infection. 
While the battle goes on, Blue forces try to cure the cyber infection to return the infected 
units to full capability. Thus, the cyber attack on Blue may change the battle outcome, and 
even if Blue were the dominant power before being affected by an infection, the battle 
may result in a Red victory. 
Following the work of Schramm (2012) we assume that a cyber incident can 
degrade the fighting capability of a force. We extend the model by representing recovery 
of the degraded force. Results from this model provide insights about the effect for 
kinetic battle of the time of the cyber attack and recovery, and supply a tool to 
compare the metrics of a cyber incident with the kinetic battle.  
Following the lead in Schramm and Gaver (2013), in this thesis we assume that 
cyber operations can take the form of malware, and cyber attacks can be represented as 
variants of biological infections. We extend the mixed epidemic combat model to a two-
sided setting. Results from this model provide insights into the tactical use of cyber 
operations. 
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The main objective of the models is to explore issues related to how cyber 
operations affect battle duration, how cyber operations affect victory conditions, and 
under which conditions the victorious side can change as a result of the cyber 
operation. Specific measures of performances include: how cyber operations affect battle 
duration and attrition; how cyber operations affect victory conditions. Other questions of 
interest include allocating limited resources for cyber operations and kinetic operations 
and how to allocate the limited resources to cyber operations and kinetic operations. 
C. ORGANIZATION OF THIS THESIS 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II contains a literature 
review of studies related to cyber operations, as well as other studies involving kinetic 
warfare models with three nature-inspired models and cyber operation effects on kinetic 
warfare models. Chapter III introduces the first model about cyber operations on kinetic 
battles, treating cyber operation as a discrete pulsed effect. We extend the original model 
by modifying the model for recovery. In Chapter IV, we introduce the original cyber 
epidemic combat model, propose an extended two-sided cyber epidemic combat model, 
and explore the proposed model for different aspects. In Chapter V, we propose new 
models by extending the assumptions in studied models. These models are generated to 
explore specific application areas. In Chapter VI, we conclude the thesis by giving the 
insights derived, which is followed by our operational recommendations, and directing 
future studies for appropriate research areas to fill the gaps. In the appendices, we describe 
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II. BACKGROUND 
The use of cyber operations in military conflict is now more than 30 years old. 
Cyber space is well-integrated with conventional kinetic combat domains. Cyber 
operations, unlike conventional warfare, can be applied on a broader scale. All 
communication systems, radars, missile launchers, and high tech weapons as well as 
infrastructure networks, financial institutions, electronic media, and power grids belong to 
the cyber domain. All of these systems are potential targets of cyber operations (Cigital, 
2013). To illustrate the range of the cyber threat, we highlight some past cyber events in 
the following section.  
A. HISTORY OF CYBER OPERATIONS 
In 1998, the first step for a cyberwar in a real kinetic battle was recorded. An 
information operations cell was established by NATO to electronically attack critical 
network infrastructure and command and control systems in the Kosovo war. Because of 
this, the air campaign operation against targets in Serbia was especially successful 
throughout the 78 days of operation according to a special report for the U.S. Air Force 
(Grant, 1999). During Operation Allied Force, Serbian forces hacked into NATO Internet 
pages, erased email archives, and made email pages unavailable for some time (Hancock, 
1999). 
In 2000, in an operation named Moonlight Maze by American Intelligence, U.S. 
officials discovered a pattern of probing of computer systems at the Pentagon, NASA, the 
U.S. Department of Energy, private universities, and research labs. This attack began in 
March 1998 and continued for nearly two years. During this time, vast amounts of data 
consisting of research and development secrets were stolen and sent over the Internet to 
Moscow to sell to the highest bidder. Moreover, according to the testimony of James 
Adams, CEO of Infrastructure Defense, Inc., the commercial value of stolen information 
varied from tens of millions of dollars to hundreds of millions of dollars (Adams, 2013). 
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Disturbingly, some of the most sensitive and secure federally-owned networks 
have been compromised. In 2006, the U.S. Naval War College computer network was 
completely inactive for some time because of the cyber intrusions (Decker and Douglass, 
2011). In 2007, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, where the first atomic bomb was 
produced, was attacked by a highly educated group who are allegedly Chinese (Decker 
and Douglass, 2011), in series of cyber attack attempts to a larger penetration of U.S. 
national security. The same year, a document was leaked about an internal review that 
reported a Chinese military cyber attack on Pentagon computer networks, including the 
one used by Defense Secretary Robert Gates (Decker and Douglass, 2011). Also, the U.S. 
government suffered “an espionage Pearl Harbor“ in the same year, in which an unknown 
foreign power broke into some of the high-tech networks of the military agencies, and 
stole terabytes of information (Shamah, 2013). 
Moreover, cyber attacks have targeted U.S. military computer systems installed 
overseas. In 2008, a hacking incident occurred on a U.S. military facility in the Middle 
East. United States Deputy Secretary of Defense William J. Lynn III had the Pentagon 
release a document, which noted that “malicious code” on a USB flash drive spread 
undetected on both classified and unclassified Pentagon systems, establishing a digital 
beachhead from which data could be transferred to servers under foreign control. “This 
was the most significant breach of U.S. military computers ever and it served as an 
important wake-up call,” Lynn wrote in an article for Foreign Affairs (Lynn, 2010).  
In 2010, for the first time the United States publicly warned of the Chinese 
military’s use of civilian computer experts in clandestine cyber attacks aimed at American 
companies and government agencies. DOD also pointed to an alleged China-based 
computer spying network dubbed GhostNet that was revealed in a research report in 2009. 
The DOD stated: “The People’s Liberation Army is using “information warfare units” to 
develop viruses to attack enemy computer systems and networks, and those units include 
civilian computer professionals” (DOD, 2009). 
The U.S., of course, is not the only target of cyber attacks. In 2010, a specially 
designed computer virus, Stuxnet, was revealed. It was a revolution in special cyber 
weapons. It was designed to spread on microchips, which means any electronic device that 
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is not a computer. It spread on electronic systems mostly in Iran to decrease the 
uncontrolled nuclear development, and it destroyed ~1000 uranium centrifuges out of 
5000, causing a capacity decrease of 20% (Sanger, 2012).  
More recently, attacks have become more damaging and more focused on specific 
weapons development programs. In 2012, according to a report prepared for the DOD by 
the Defense Science Board, Chinese hackers have gained access to designs of more than 
two dozen major U.S. weapons systems. The Washington Post said that these designs 
included combat aircraft and ships, missile defense systems including the Patriot missile 
system, the Navy’s Aegis ballistic missile defense systems, the F/A-18 fighter jet, the V-
22 Osprey, the Black Hawk helicopter and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (Nakashima, 
2013).  
Equally dangerous are attacks targeting the national economy. In 2012, distributed 
denial of service (DDoS) attacks were carried out against the New York Stock Exchange 
and a number of banks, including J.P. Morgan Chase. Credit for these attacks was claimed 
by a hacktivist group called the Qassam Cyber Fighters, which have labeled the attacks 
“Operation Ababil.” The attacks had been executed in several phases and were restarted in 
March 2013. The size of the attacks (65 gigabits/second) is more consistent with a state 
actor than with a typical hactivist DoS attack (~2 gigabits/ second) (Gonsalves, 2012). 
Such threats are not reserved for the U.S. alone. In 2013 an attack was launched against 
South Korea. A logic bomb struck machines “and wiped the hard drives and master boot 
records of at least three banks and two media companies simultaneously” (Singel, 2010). 
Overall, the amount of malicious code generated over the world is increasing 
exponentially (see Figure 1), which affects the military networks as well as infrastructure, 
government and supply chain related networks. Moreover, with an increased dependency 
on cyberspace, the complexity of the tools and the harmful effects of these infected codes 
can become increasingly dangerous. 
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 New types of malicious codes increased dramatically in the recent years. Figure 1. 
The units are in millions (from The Economist, 2010). 
 
B. BUILDING BLOCKS 
Lanchester models are well-understood ordinary differential equation (ODE) 
models to explain mutual attrition behaviors in combat.  
Cyber warfare is not a well-understood phenomenon, and does not have a single 
well-studied and commonly accepted mathematical model. We study two different models 
which capture different aspects of cyber warfare. We aim to explore the effect of recovery 
by using closed form Lanchester models, and we aim to capture the essence of “exploiting 
vulnerabilities by spreading malicious code” behavior of cyber operations by using ODE 
models of disease spread. 
This section reviews the basic structure and terminology for each model. 
The combat models of Schramm (2012) include shock effects, which change some 
attributes of fighting forces. We use the shock effects to represent cyber effects (cyber 
attack) on a force, which change the fighting capabilities of the force. Fighting capabilities 
include kinetic capabilities (kinetic attack) which are represented by Lanchester aimed-
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fire. Attrition is a result of kinetic attack only, and cyber effects do not cause attrition. We 
use two shock effects in the battle one representing the cyber attack, and the other 
representing the recovery of the effects of the cyber attack. We refer to shock time as the 
time the cyber attack (first shock) happens, and recovery time as the time the force 
recovers (second shock) back to original attributes. We use two opposing forces in the 
model, named Red force (Z) as cyber attacker, and Blue force (B) as cyber defender, unless 
stated otherwise.  
Schramm and Gaver (2013) combines kinetic battle models (Lanchester models) 
with an epidemiological model of disease progression for cyber operations. These models 
represent numbers of fighting forces, which change due to a physical loss of a part of the 
force (attrition). Lanchester models use attack rate (kinetic attack rate) to represent the 
number of effective shots (or kills) on the adversary. The attack rate represents not only 
the rate of fire by the attacker, but also represents the rate of successful defense (shielding) 
by the defender. So, the attack rate of Blue (to Red), is equivalent to the attrition rate of 
Red. Attrition can be a result of kinetic combat (kinetic battle, conventional combat) only, 
and infection can be a result of cyber operation (cyber attack) only. A force which can 
conduct an offensive cyber operation has a cyber attack capability. A force which has 
assets and procedures (defensive cyber actions) to reduce the effect of a cyber attack, has a 
cyber defensive capability. A cyber attack may cause a loss of capability (cyber infection, 
infection) on the adversary, and cyber defense may reduce this degrading effect. We 
assume in this study that these two capabilities go side by side, and any force with cyber 
attack capability also has cyber defense capability. However, one cyber capability may be 
stronger than the other. 
The term infection (disease) used in this study is a broad term, which can be used 
for any effect that reduces a force’s warfighting capabilities, and is not lethal. In this 
study, this effect is limited to cyber malware. It can be defined differently, in order to 
model different effects. We use infected unit to describe any unit affected by a cyber 
attack. This type of infection is designed to spread in the cyberspace, using system gaps 
and backdoors, which we call vulnerabilities. A detailed definitions list for technical terms 
is added in Appendix A. 
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1. Combat (Kinetic) Models 
Lanchester Models are the main combat models used in this study. We limit the 
models to Aimed-fire and Area-fire, but the models can be used in various ways. These 
models use differential equations to describe changes in the surviving force levels in a 
combat. Each force is assumed to consist of homogeneous units in terms of their 
geography and range. For each force, we assume that we can calculate an overall kill rate 
per instant of time (dt). For the Aimed-fire model, we assume that these shots are aimed at 
individual adversarial live targets. For the Area-fire model, we assume that an area of 
interest is under fire (e.g., artillery, mortar, air support), without considering specific 
target attributes. Although these two models seem similar, their units of measures are 
different, and we cannot compare the results from these two models directly. 
We summarize these two models as follows. 
a. Aimed Fire 
For Aimed-fire, the basic equations area::Equation Section (Next)
Equation Section (Next) 
𝑑𝐵(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡




=  −𝛽 𝐵(𝑡). (2.2) 
Here, B(t) is the number of overall alive Blue units at time t, and Z(t) is the 
corresponding number of overall alive Red units. The term 𝑑𝐵(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
 means the change in the 
Blue force in dt, and 𝜌 represents the constant attack rate of Red. So, in an aimed-fire 
model, the number of killed in Blue force depends on number of shooters on Red force, 
and their shooting effectiveness against individual Blue targets. Similarly, 𝑑𝑍(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
 represents 
the change in Red force in dt, and 𝛽 is the constant attack rate of Blue. Note that the 
recipient of aimed fire is explicitly an active (fighting) member of the opposing force. 
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Attack rates in these models represent both offensive and defensive measures. That 
is, there is no explicit means to change the kinetic defense. Defensive measures may be 
considered when estimating attack rate. The attack rates in these models are all constants. 
They do not depend on time or size of the force. 
The exchange ratio (𝑑𝐵(𝑡)
𝑑𝑍(𝑡)) is the ratio of change in force level of B(t) with respect 
to Z(t) in dt; it depends on force levels, and attack rate ratios in Aimed-fire models.  
b. Area Fire 
For Area-fire, the basic equations are:  
𝑑𝐵(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡




=  −𝛽 𝐵(𝑡) 𝑍(𝑡).  (2.4) 
 
Here, the number of Blue units killed in the Area-fire model depends on number of 
Red shooters, number of targets on the area (density), and Red’s shooting effectiveness. 
The exchange ratio (𝑑𝐵(𝑡)
𝑑𝑍(𝑡)) does not depend on force levels, and solely depends on attack 
rates in the Area-fire model.  
Aimed-fire and Area-fire models are the most commonly used combat models. 
They are crude, but roughly explanatory. Using experimental data and proper tools, 
combat factors can be understood and even can be predicted. Figure 2 compares a 
Lanchester aimed-fire model with reinforcements to real data from the well-known study 
of the 1945 Battle of Iwo-Jima (Engel, 1954). 
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 Comparison of the Lanchester model outcome and real results for the 1945 Figure 2. 
Battle of Iwo-Jima (from Engel, 1954). 
 
2. Epidemic Models 
The commonly used mathematical models in epidemiology are S-I and S-I-R 
models. An overall population is partitioned into three groups, described as susceptible 
(S), infected (I), and recovered (R) (Murray, 2002). Although there are more detailed and 
expanded infection models, we use the S-I-R model as a base model, as was used in 
Schramm and Gaver (2013), and use it to construct later models.  
Epidemic models are classified by the spread type. We use Kermack-McKendrick 
type spread in this study, which is consistent with general S-I-R models, but we will not 
consider natural births, deaths, migration, or partial immunization as studied in the paper 
(Kermack and McKendrick, 1927). Although there are different types of infection spread 
models (i.e., Lanchester infection, Daley-Kendall infection, Michaelis - Menten infection 
etc.), for different environments and assumptions, we will use a simple, generalized, and 
well-studied model for infection spread. 
For a fixed population of size 𝑁, 𝑁 = 𝑆(𝑡) + 𝐼(𝑡) + 𝑅(𝑡), where S(t) (respectively 
I(t) and R(t)) is the number of population members that are susceptible (respectively 






= − Ѱ  𝑆(𝑡)  𝐼(𝑡), (2.5) 
 𝑑𝐼(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
 = Ѱ  𝑆(𝑡)  𝐼(𝑡)  −  𝛾   𝐼(𝑡) , (2.6) 
 𝑑𝑅(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
= 𝛾  𝐼(𝑡). (2.7) 
The term 𝑑𝑆(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
 represents the change in the subpopulation susceptible to the 
disease, which depends on the contacts between members that are infected and 
susceptible, and spread rate (Ѱ). The term 𝑑𝑅(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
 represents the change in the subpopulation 
recovered from the disease, in this case equal to the cure rate (𝛾) times the number 
infected. The term 𝑑𝐼(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
 represents the change in number of the population that is infected, 
by using other two equations because the population total (N) is constant.  
We use these models to explore different aspects of cyber warfare on kinetic 
battles. Appendix C discusses the methodology we use to understand and explain these 
models. 
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III. DISCRETE CYBER EFFECTS 
In this chapter, we consider the discrete effects of cyber operations on combat. We 
build on the work of Schramm (2012), who considers a kinetic battle between two 
opponents, one of whom suffers a discontinuous “shock” that instantly degrades its 
fighting capability. An important aspect regarding this model is that only the kinetic battle 
results in attrition. The cyber effect does not cause any attrition, but changes its pace. The 
motivating idea is to consider a fighting force whose effectiveness derives from its ability 
to coordinate its operations using a communications and/or computer network. The 
degradation to fighting capability comes from the loss of the network, which is presumed 
to happen suddenly (e.g., from a cyber attack by the opponent). Schramm explores the 
impact of the timing and size of this shock on the kinetic battle. 
We extend this work by adding a second shock that cures the impacts of the first 
shock (e.g., corresponding to a restoration of the underlying network). This second shock 
helps to limit the effects of the cyber attack, and helps to quantify its impact on overall 
attrition. We restrict attention to Lanchester aimed fire calculations in this chapter.  
We begin with a summary of Schramm (2012). Consider a battle involving aimed 
fire. Consider the case where Blue suffers a shock at time 𝑡∗ that decreases Blue’s attack 
rate from 𝛽𝑈 to 𝛽𝐷, where 𝛽𝐷 < 𝛽𝑈. The modified Lanchester equations then become the 
following.Equation Section (Next)  𝑑𝑍(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
=  −𝛽𝑈 𝐵(𝑡) , 𝑡 <  𝑡∗ (3.1)   𝑑𝑍(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
=  −𝛽𝐷 𝐵(𝑡) , 𝑡∗  ≤  𝑡  (3.2)   𝑑𝐵(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡




 A. EXPLORATION OF LANCHESTER MODELS WITH DISCONTINUITIES  
In their most general form, let ( )tβ  denote the instantaneous attack rate of Blue 
(on Red) at time t, and similarly let ( )tρ  denote the attack rate of Red (on Blue). The 
general form of the Lanchester equations is as follows:  
 𝑑𝑍(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
=  −𝛽(𝑡)𝐵(𝑡), (3.4) 
 𝑑𝐵(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
=  −𝜌(𝑡) 𝑍(𝑡), (3.5) 
 
𝑑𝑍(𝑡)
𝑑𝐵(𝑡) =  𝛽(𝑡) 𝜌(𝑡) 𝐵(𝑡) 𝑍(𝑡) , (3.6) 
 𝑍(𝑡) 𝑑𝑍(𝑡) =  𝛽(𝑡)
𝜌(𝑡)  𝐵(𝑡) 𝑑𝐵(𝑡), (3.7) 
 � 𝜌(𝑡) 𝑍(𝑡) 𝑑𝑍(𝑡)𝑡
0
=  � 𝛽(𝑡) 𝐵(𝑡) 𝑑𝐵(𝑡)𝑡
0
. (3.8) 
The case where Blue suffers a single shock degrading its combat capability 
corresponds to the following attack rates:  
 𝜌(𝑡) =                                       𝜌, 0 ≤  𝑡 <  𝑡𝑓    
 𝛽𝑈 , 0 ≤  𝑡 <  𝑡∗                  
 𝛽(𝑡) =    𝛽𝐷 , 𝑡∗ ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡𝑓 
 
Let ft  denote the time at which the battle ends. We define the following 
mathematical terms: 
B(t = 0) = 𝐵0 ,   Z(t = 0) = 𝑍0      Initial number of force units, 
B(t = 𝑡∗) = 𝐵∗ ,   Z(t = 𝑡∗) = 𝑍∗     Number of force units at the time of shock, 
B(t = 𝑡𝑓) = 𝐵𝑓 ,   Z(t = 𝑡𝑓) = 𝑍𝑓    Number of force units at the end of the battle. 
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Throughout this analysis we assume that  𝐵0 > 𝐵∗ > 𝐵𝑓  and  𝑍0 > 𝑍∗ > 𝑍𝑓. To 
evaluate for 𝐵∗ and 𝑍∗ , we use the numbers just before the time of shock, to be consistent. 
We can rewrite the equation for given model Eq. (3.8): 
  𝜌 � 𝑍 𝑑𝑍0
𝑡𝑓
=  𝛽𝑈 �  𝐵 𝑑𝐵0
𝑡∗
 +  𝛽𝐷 �  𝐵 𝑑𝐵𝑡∗
𝑡𝑓
 . (3.9) 
This implies that: 
𝜌 �𝑍02 − 𝑍𝑓2� = 𝛽𝑈 (𝐵02 − 𝐵∗2) +  𝛽𝐷 �𝐵∗2 − 𝐵𝑓2� . (3.10) 
The end of the battle can be set when the force size of one side (Red) is 70% of 
initial number of units, or the force size of the other side (Blue) is 50% of initial number 
of units. For simplicity, we use fight to the finish in this study. In case of a fight to the 
finish, at the end of the battle one of the force sizes would reach zero. 
The new dynamic state equation (with shock) is: 
𝐵∗
2 − 𝐵𝑓
2 = 𝛽𝑈 �𝐵02 − 𝐵𝑓2� − 𝜌 �𝑍02 − 𝑍𝑓2�
𝛽𝑈 − 𝛽𝐷
.   (3.11) 
We can summarize the dynamic state equations both without and with cyber effect:  
𝛽𝑈 �𝐵02 − 𝐵𝑓2� − 𝜌 �𝑍02 − 𝑍𝑓2� =  0       Without cyber effect  
𝛽𝑈 �𝐵02 − 𝐵𝑓2� − 𝜌 �𝑍02 − 𝑍𝑓2� =  �𝐵∗2 − 𝐵𝑓2� (𝛽𝑈 − 𝛽𝐷)  With cyber effect. 
The difference in the dynamic state equation caused by the cyber attack of Red on 
Blue is:  
�𝐵∗
2 − 𝐵𝑓
2� (𝛽𝑈 − 𝛽𝐷). (3.12) 
Note that regardless of the victorious side, one of 𝐵𝑓 or 𝑍𝑓 will be zero and the 
other one will be positive, which represents the survivors from the battle when the battle is 
over and there is no more cyber attack. We refer to this case as “no recovery,” because in 
this case Blue was attacked but did not recover, and continued to fight with degraded 
attack rate 𝛽𝐷. 
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We display the results of a numerical experiment in Figure 3 and Figure 4. Both 
sides start with same initial numbers, but with different attack rates. We increased the 
detail level in the graphs by using 10 steps in 1 time (t), and to reproduce these figures, 
time should be divided by 10. 
 
 
 One-sided shock effect on number of survivors.  Figure 3. 
Given initial force sizes 𝐵0 = 𝑍0 = 1000, the battle begins with 𝛽𝑈 = 0.5, 𝜌 = 0.3  
However, at time 𝑡∗1 , Blue suffers a shock that reduces its attack rate to 𝛽𝐷 = 0.05 
Despite the initial fighting superiority of Blue, Red wins the battle. 
 
 
 Shock effect on Blue’s kinetic attack rates.  Figure 4. 
(Time is multiplied by 10 on both figures) 
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Figure 3 shows the change in number of units for both sides throughout the 
combat. At 𝑡∗1 we see a change in Blue’s attack rate, which (we assume) is caused by a 
cyber attack launched by Red (Figure 5).The cyber attack affects the attrition of both 
sides. Explicitly, it enables Red to win despite an initial fighting inferiority. 
B. DISCONTINUOUS DEGRADATION AND RECOVERY 
We next consider the case where Blue suffers but then recovers from a cyber 
attack. We do this through the use of two shocks, in which the first one downgrades the 
attack rate of the Blue to 𝛽𝐷 and the second one upgrades the attack rate back to normal 
𝛽𝑈. Let *1t denote the time of the first (degrading) shock, and let *2t denote the time of the 
second (recovery) shock. The corresponding attack rates for each side are: 
 𝜌(𝑡) =                                    𝜌,     0 ≤  𝑡 ≤ 𝑡𝑓 
 𝛽𝑈 ,    0 ≤  𝑡 <  𝑡∗1                  
 𝛽(𝑡) =  𝛽𝐷 ,   𝑡∗1 ≤ 𝑡 <  𝑡∗2 
 𝛽𝑈,   𝑡∗2 ≤  𝑡 ≤ 𝑡𝑓                        
Dropping the explicit time dependence for B and Z, we write the battle equations 
as:  𝑑𝑍
𝑑𝑡
=  −𝛽𝑈 𝐵 , 0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤  𝑡∗1 (3.13) 
  𝑑𝑍
𝑑𝑡
=  −𝛽𝐷 𝐵 , 𝑡∗1 ≤ 𝑡 < 𝑡∗2 (3.14)   𝑑𝑍
𝑑𝑡
=  −𝛽𝑈 𝐵 , 𝑡∗2 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑡𝑓 (3.15)   𝑑𝐵
𝑑𝑡
=  −𝜌𝑈 𝑍 , ∀ 𝑡  .  (3.16) 
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Now we use the same numerical experiment as Figure 3 and Figure 4, but we 
implement the second shock to the system. Now Blue is degraded by a cyber attack at 𝑡∗1 
and Blue recovers from the cyber attack at 𝑡∗2. Both sides start with same initial numbers, 
but with different attack rates. Figure 5 and Figure 6 can be compared to Figure 3 and 
Figure 4 to visually see the effects of recovery at 𝑡∗2.  
  
 Effect of two shocks on number of  survivors.   Figure 5. 
Here, Blue suffers a degradation at time 𝑡∗1 but recovers at 𝑡∗2 and is still able to 
win the battle (Time is multiplied by 10.). 
 
 Two shock effects on kinetic attack rates. Figure 6. 
(Time is multiplied by 10.) 
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Figure 5 shows the change in number of units throughout the combat, in case of 
two shocks. Figure 6 shows the change in kinetic attack rates of forces. At 𝑡∗1 we see a 
drop in Blue’s attack rate, and at 𝑡∗2 it recovers. These figures show how the recovery 
from a cyber attack affects the attrition of both sides. Explicitly, it changes the pattern of 
Red, and the change in Red causes a change in Blue. Now Blue wins the battle, again. 
Using the same notation, and keeping the same set of assumptions as  𝐵0 > 𝐵∗1 >
𝐵∗2 > 𝐵𝑓  and  𝑍0 > 𝑍∗1 > 𝑍∗2 > 𝑍𝑓, which means that the cyber attack happens (𝑡∗1) 
before recovery (𝑡∗2). Note that 𝑡𝑓 cannot be smaller than 𝑡∗2, and 𝑡∗2 cannot be smaller 
than 𝑡∗1 for a logical sequence. They can be equal, but then there would be no change in 
state equation. We can rewrite the equation (3.9) for given model: 
  𝜌 � 𝑍 𝑑𝑍0
𝑡𝑓
=  𝛽𝑈 �  𝐵 𝑑𝐵0
𝑡∗1
 + 𝛽𝐷 �  𝐵 𝑑𝐵𝑡∗1
𝑡∗2
 +  𝛽𝑈 �  𝐵 𝑑𝐵𝑡∗2
𝑡𝑓
 . (3.17) 
The closed form of the equations is, in this special case: 
𝜌 �𝑍02 − 𝑍𝑓2� = 𝛽𝑈 (𝐵02 − 𝐵∗12 ) + 𝛽𝐷 (𝐵∗12 − 𝐵∗22 ) + 𝛽𝑈 �𝐵∗22 − 𝐵𝑓2�. (3.18) 
The expression 𝐵∗12  uses the number of Blues at the time of the successful cyber 
attack, and the expression 𝐵∗22  uses the number of Blues at time of full recovery from 
cyber-affected targets. The term (𝛽𝑈  − 𝛽𝐷) represents the reduction in kinetic attack rate 
due to a successful cyber attack.  
The dynamic state equation in this case is: 
𝐵∗1
2 − 𝐵∗2
2 = 𝛽𝑈 �𝐵02 − 𝐵𝑓2� −  𝜌𝑈  �𝑍02 − 𝑍𝑓2�
𝛽𝑈  − 𝛽𝐷 , (3.19) 
 We can summarize the dynamic state equations as: 
𝛽𝑈 �𝐵02 − 𝐵𝑓2� − 𝜌 �𝑍02 − 𝑍𝑓2� =  0      Without cyber effect 
𝛽𝑈 �𝐵02 − 𝐵𝑓2� − 𝜌 �𝑍02 − 𝑍𝑓2� =  (𝐵∗12 − 𝐵∗22 ) (𝛽𝑈 − 𝛽𝐷)   With cyber effect. 
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In this case change in the dynamic state equation by the cyber attack of Red to 
Blue is:  
 (B∗12 − B∗22 ) (βU − βD). (3.20) 
which is the same result with one shock. The reason for the square is because we use an 
underlying square law (aimed fire) in the model. This would be a straight multiplication if 
we used a linear law (area fire). 
We can also adapt (3.19) for the cases with strictly one shock (no cure), if we use 
the second shock time as the end of the battle (𝑡∗2 ≤ 𝑡𝑓). We should point out that the end 
of battle can be predefined as a level (i.e., percentage, number) for any of two sides; 
however we use a fight to the finish assumption to obtain a clear picture of the model 
results.  
(3.12) is another important equation which provides us an intuitive result 
concerning how a cyber attack on one side (B here) can change the opponent’s 
effectiveness, and can change the overall battle result. The cyber attack to Blue causes a 
difference in dynamic state equation as much as (𝐵∗12 − 𝐵∗22 ) (𝛽𝑈  − 𝛽𝐷), which shows 
itself as the reduction in attrition of Red. So if a cyber attack starts at 𝑡∗1 and ends (or 
cures) by 𝑡∗2, and the effectiveness drops down to 𝛽𝐷 in between these times; assuming 
that by a cyber attack the whole Blue force is affected, the damage caused by this attack 
can be summarized as: 
�𝑩∗𝟏
𝟐 − 𝑩∗𝟐
𝟐 � �𝜷𝑼 − 𝜷𝑫�. (3.21) 
Eqs. (3.19) and (3.21) show that the period of time between cyber attack time 
and recovery time is crucial. Also, if we have a central or a bottleneck cyber target (i.e., 
a main network server, a communication server), the size of affected Blue force is 
crucial. Both of these terms will greatly boost the effectiveness of Red’s cyber attack on 
Blue, but the reduction in the kinetic attack rate of Blue caused by Red’s cyber attack will 
boost the effectiveness of the cyber attack proportionally.  
Similar to previous numerical experiments, we use the same numerical experiment 
with Figure 5 and Figure 6 but we change the time of second shock. Now Blue is degraded 
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by a cyber attack at 𝑡∗1 and Blue recovers from the cyber attack at 𝑡∗2, but the duration in 
between these two shocks are increased by 30%. Both sides start with same initial 
numbers, with different attack rates. Figure 7 and Figure 8 can be compared to Figure 5 
and Figure 6 to visually see the impacts of timing of recovery (𝑡∗2) and the duration     
(𝑡∗2-𝑡∗1) of cyber attack effects.  
 
 
 Effect of a longer cyber attack duratıon on number of survıvors.   Figure 7. 




 Effect of two shocks on kinetic attack rates for a longer cyber effect time. Figure 8. 
(Time is multiplied by 10 on both figures) 
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The increase in time between the two shocks affects the battle significantly and 
helps the cyber attacker (Red) to win the battle. Figure 7 displays the change in number of 
units, in case of two shocks for a larger timeframe compared to Figure 5. Figure 8 displays 
the change in kinetic attack rates of the forces. At 𝑡∗1 again, we see a drop in Blue’s attack 
rate, and at 𝑡∗2 it recovers. Comparing these figures we see that when it takes a longer time 
(30%) for Blue to recover, Red wins the battle. 
C. ADDITIONAL EXTENSIONS 
1. Special Case: Recovery Decisions by Blue 
Now consider the case in which Blue can make a decision to fight against the 
cyber attack or not. Since any defensive actions will need some resources, we can compare 
how many resources Blue should allocate for recovering after a successful cyber attack. 
When should Blue continue with the kinetic attack (ignore the cyber incident), and when 
should Blue try to recover? 
We showed that without recovering the cyber-affected units, the reduction in the 
state equation will be until the end of the battle so the difference in the state equation is 
�𝐵∗1
2 − 𝐵𝑓
2� (𝛽𝑈  − 𝛽𝐷). Also recovering the cyber affected Blue units, the difference in 
the state equation can be estimated as (𝐵∗12 − 𝐵∗22 ) (𝛽𝑈  − 𝛽𝐷). That means recovery 
causes a change in state equation as �𝐵∗22 − 𝐵𝑓2� (𝛽𝑈 − 𝛽𝐷). Now the question is “is this 
difference worth allocating resources to recover?”  
We can rephrase this expression as, the power of attack gained back (attrition of 
Red) by Blue recovering from a cyber attack is:  
�𝑩∗𝟐
𝟐 − 𝑩𝒇
𝟐� �𝜷𝑼 − 𝜷𝑫�. (3.22) 
 
2. Special Case: Reinforcements for Blue 
Suppose Blue can obtain one of two types of assistance at time 𝑡∗2. One is cyber 
assistance which will increase Blue attack rate back to 𝛽𝑈 from 𝛽𝐷. The other type of 
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assistance will add 𝐵𝑟 units to the kinetic battle and Blue’s attack rate will remain at the 
lower rate 𝛽𝐷. Considering that Blue receives a reinforcement unit in number 𝐵𝑟 at time 
𝑡∗2, the second shock at 𝑡∗2 can be used for either recovery, or not.  
Obviously, if the gain from kinetic battle is greater than the gain from recovery, 
then the assistance should be used in kinetic combat.  
We need to compare two cases for 𝑡∗2, the case where there is no recovery and use 
the reinforcements, 𝐵𝑟, with degraded rate, and the case where the assistance is used to 
recover from the cyber attack. So if, 𝐵𝑟2𝛽𝐷 >  �𝐵∗22 − 𝐵𝑓2� �𝛽𝑈  − 𝛽𝐷� then Blue should 





2 >  𝛽𝑈𝛽𝐷 − 1 . (3.23) 
 
Or in other words, assuming this is a fight to the finish battle (e.g., 𝐵𝑓 = 0), use in 
the assistance to recover from cyber attack if, 
 
 𝛽𝑈 − 𝛽𝐷
𝛽𝐷  >  � 𝐵𝑟𝐵∗2�2. (3.24) 
 
So, this comparison gives some insight about what is most important. If a unit is 
under cyber attack with a shock such as a computer virus attack, a triggered zero day 
attack, a DoS ( denial of service) attack, a highly centralized target (network bottleneck) 
attack, etc., we can use this comparison. It means using the kinetic combat assistance  if 
the degraded attack rate does not make much difference or if the additional kinetic force is 
significantly larger compared to Blue forces in the theater at (estimated) time of recovery. 
Numerically, if the arriving force (𝐵𝑟) is roughly 10% of the size of the recovery 
time force (𝐵∗2), it makes sense to use it in kinetic battle if the decrease in attack rate 
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because of cyber attack 𝛽𝑈 − 𝛽𝐷 is less than 1% of 𝛽𝐷 (i.e., cyber attack is very 
ineffective). However, Blue should use the cyber assistance to recover the affected unit(s) 
if the decrease ratio to downgrade attack ratio is more than 1%. 
Now we have a value for the cyber attack effect to compare and evaluate with 
kinetic battle (𝐵∗12 − 𝐵𝑓2)�𝛽𝑈  − 𝛽𝐷�, and another value for recovering from a cyber attack (𝐵∗22 − 𝐵𝑓2)�𝛽𝑈  − 𝛽𝐷�. With the fact that 𝐵∗12 > 𝐵∗22  , we have a solid background to 
compare these effects. Under given assumptions, we can generalize that: 
 If Blue is able to prevent a successful cyber attack at 𝑡∗1, the gain (prevented loss) 
will be: 
 �𝐵∗12 − 𝐵𝑓2� �𝛽𝑈  − 𝛽𝐷�, (3.25) 
 
 If Blue is able to recover from a successful cyber attack, at 𝑡∗2 the gain (prevented 
loss) will be: 
 �𝐵∗22 − 𝐵𝑓2� �𝛽𝑈  − 𝛽𝐷�, (3.26) 
 
These calculations assume that   𝐵∗1 > 𝐵∗2  > 𝐵𝑓  for all times t  
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IV. CONTINUOUS CYBER EFFECTS 
In this chapter, we model continuous or gradual effects of cyber operations on 
combats. We build on the work of Schramm and Gaver (2013), which represents 
continuous effect by a cyber epidemic model that causes degradation in kinetic 
capabilities of the cyber infected side. We expand this model by adding cyber capabilities 
to the infected side, which adds the capability to infect and degrade the kinetic capabilities 
of the adversary side, also. We explore the interactions of these two cyber epidemics on 
kinetic battle results, both numerically and analytically. 
The spread of a cyber infection is a critical aspect of cyber operation in this model. 
We assume that a cyber effect starts with an infected unit. We control the effectiveness of 
a cyber attack by changing infection spread (spread rate, spread) .The infection decreases 
the effectiveness of a kinetic attack by degrading the attack rate. We use patch (patch 
rate) to describe the cure of infection.  
In order to model infection and spread of disease within the fighting population, 
we assign each fighting unit to one of three states. A unit is in State S if it is not affected 
by cyber infection, but is vulnerable and can be infected at any time. A unit is in State I 
(infected) if it is affected by cyber infection, and such units have a decreased kinetic attack 
rate within the adversary. A unit is in State R if it is immune to the particular infection, 
either by removing the infection or by using a patch (immunization) for the infection. 
With time, the number of units in state S decreases because susceptible units will be either 
infected and transformed to state I, or cured and transformed to state R. Cure before 
infection is by patching the susceptible, which is cyber-vaccination for the infection. The 
number of units in state R increases, because a recovered unit in state R will cure its 
contacts whether they are in state S or state I. The number of units in a state I can either 
increase or decrease over time, depending on factors, which we shall explore. Modeling 
infection adds a second layer to combat modeling, so at any time these states will decrease 
on top of mentioned changes at a constant rate caused by kinetic attacks. 
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A. THE MIXED EPIDEMIC COMBAT MODEL  
We begin with the mixed epidemic combat model of Schramm and Gaver (2013). 
Capital letters represent state variables which change in time. For ease of understanding, 
we drop the time-dependence in our notation. So, for instance, S represents S(t). The 
original model consists of four differential equations: Equation Section (Next) 
 𝑑𝑍
𝑑𝑡
= − 𝛽𝑈(𝑆 + 𝑅) − 𝛽𝐷 (𝐼) , (4.1) 
 𝑑𝑆
𝑑𝑡
= (−𝜉 𝑆 𝐼 − 𝜂 𝑆 𝑅) −  𝜌 𝑍 𝑆
𝑆 + 𝐼 + 𝑅 , (4.2) 
 𝑑𝐼
𝑑𝑡
 = (𝜉 𝐼 𝑆 − 𝜂 𝐼 𝑅) −  𝜌 𝑍 𝐼
𝑆 + 𝐼 + 𝑅 , (4.3) 
 𝑑𝑅
𝑑𝑡
= (𝜂 𝑆 𝑅 + 𝜂 𝑅 𝐼) −  𝜌 𝑍 𝑅
𝑆 + 𝐼 + 𝑅 . (4.4) 
 
I represents number of infected units in Blue force at time t, S represents number 
of susceptible units in Blue force at time t, and R represents number of recovered 
(patched) in Blue force at time t. The total size of the fighting Blue force is the sum of 
these variables, i.e., B=S+I+R, which decreases in time. Also, Z represents total number 
of fighting Red units, which decreases. These variables change continuously in time. Also, 
Greek letters represent rates, which are constant coefficients: 𝛽𝑈 represents attack rate for 
each Blue unit that is either susceptible or recovered.  𝛽𝐷 represents decreased attack rate 
of each Blue unit that is infected, and 𝜌 represents normal attack rate of each member of 
the Red force. There are of attack rates for Blue, because the attack rate is assumed to 
change after a cyber incident. Also, 𝜉 represents spread rate of the infection in Blue, and 𝜂 
represents cure rate of the infection of Blue, which occurs when a recovered Blue 
encounters an infected Blue. Also, susceptible members of Blue recover when 
encountering recovered Blues at rate 𝜂. 
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The value of Z changes according to different rates of attrition ( 𝛽𝑈,  𝛽𝐷), and uses 
Lanchester aimed-fire model (2.1, 2.2). The value of B changes depending on kinetic 
effects and on epidemic effects according to the S-I-R epidemic model (2.5- 2.7). In this 
original model, Red is subject to aimed fire from all Blue units, and Blue is subject to 
aimed fire and cyber attack by Red. Only the Red force has cyber attack capability, and 
the asymmetry in capability of forces simplifies the analysis. 
B. EXPANDED CYBER EPIDEMIC COMBAT MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
Building upon this initial cyber epidemic combat model, we want to explore the 
interactions and implications for the clash of two cyber-capable sides, such that each side 
can degrade kinetic capabilities of the adversary using a cyber infection. We  propose to 
use two-sided kinetic and cyber epidemic combat models; in order to understand the 
impacts on the battle of two fighting forces with both having asymmetric capabilities. 
1. Two-sided Cyber Epidemic Combat Model  
We start with generalizing the Schramm and Gaver (2013) model such that both 
sides have kinetic and cyber capability. This is the base model for us, which assumes 
aimed fire. The subscript B represents variables and parameters related to Blue force. The 
subscript Z represents variables and parameters related to the Red force.  
 
For simplicity, suppress the explicit time-dependence notation, e.g.,  𝑆𝐵 = 𝑆𝐵(𝑡) 
 
B   : level of Blue force at time t 
Z   : level of Red force at time t 
𝜉𝐵   : Infection spread rate within B 
𝜂𝐵   : Infection patch rate within B 
𝜉𝑍   : Infection spread rate within Z 
𝜂𝑍   : Infection patch rate within Z 
𝜌𝑈, 𝜌𝐷  : Normal attack rate, and decreased (by infection) attack rate of Z on B 
𝛽𝑈, 𝛽𝐷  : Normal attack rate, and decreased (by infection) attack rate of B on Z 
 





= (−𝜉𝐵𝑆𝐵𝐼𝐵 − 𝜂𝐵𝑆𝐵𝑅𝐵) − [𝜌𝑈(𝑆𝑍 + 𝑅𝑍) + 𝜌𝐷 (𝐼𝑍)] 𝑆𝐵𝑆𝐵 + 𝐼𝐵 + 𝑅𝐵 (4.5) 
𝑑𝐼𝐵
𝑑𝑡
 = (+𝜉𝐵𝐼𝐵𝑆𝐵 − 𝜂𝐵𝐼𝐵𝑅𝐵) − [𝜌𝑈(𝑆𝑍 + 𝑅𝑍) + 𝜌𝐷 (𝐼𝑍)] 𝐼𝐵𝑆𝐵 + 𝐼𝐵 + 𝑅𝐵 (4.6) 
𝑑𝑅𝐵
𝑑𝑡
= (+𝜂𝐵𝑅𝐵𝑆𝐵 + 𝜂𝐵𝑅𝐵𝐼𝐵) − [𝜌𝑈(𝑆𝑍 + 𝑅𝑍) + 𝜌𝐷 (𝐼𝑍)] 𝑅𝐵𝑆𝐵 + 𝐼𝐵 + 𝑅𝐵 (4.7) 
𝑑𝑆𝑍
𝑑𝑡
= (−𝜉𝑍𝑆𝑍𝐼𝑍 − 𝜂𝑍𝑆𝑍𝑅𝑍) − [ 𝛽𝑈(𝑆𝐵 + 𝑅𝐵) + 𝛽𝐷 (𝐼𝐵)] 𝑆𝑧𝑆𝑍 + 𝐼𝑍 + 𝑅𝑍 (4.8) 
𝑑𝐼𝑍
𝑑𝑡
 = (+𝜉𝑍𝐼𝑍 𝑆𝑍 − 𝜂𝑍𝐼𝑍 𝑅𝑍) − [ 𝛽𝑈(𝑆𝐵 + 𝑅𝐵) + 𝛽𝐷 (𝐼𝐵)] 𝐼𝑧𝑆𝑍 + 𝐼𝑍 + 𝑅𝑍 (4.9) 
𝑑𝑅𝑍
𝑑𝑡
 = (+𝜂𝑍𝑅𝑍𝑆𝑍 + 𝜂𝑍𝑅𝑍𝐼𝑍) − [ 𝛽𝑈(𝑆𝐵 + 𝑅𝐵) + 𝛽𝐷 (𝐼𝐵)] 𝑅𝑧𝑆𝑍 + 𝐼𝑍 + 𝑅𝑍 (4.10)    
  Cyber Effects          Kinetic Effects         Fraction of Kinetic Effect 
          Unaimed           Aimed Fire 
                Degradation             Attrition 
 
The first part of each equation represents the cyber effects on the total change of 
the number of units in a state, using an S-I-R epidemic spread . The second part of the 
equation, represents the kinetic effects on the depletion, using aimed-fire. This focuses 
proportionately on opposing units on each cyber-affected state. 
We use the Lanchester aimed-fire model on kinetic battles unless stated otherwise. 
A modified SIR disease-spread model, as Schramm and Gaver (2013) describes the cyber 
effect. We make several assumptions. First, kinetic effects are assumed to be homogenous 
for each opposing force; each live unit has its own chance (probability) to survive in 
aimed-fire. Second, we assume there is only one vulnerability in each unit to exploit and 
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to patch (i.e., there is only a single type of infection). Third, we assume that infected units 
can be cured without any permanent damage, and return to original strength. Finally, we 
assume that both the kinetic battle and cyber operations (as represented by the infection) 
start at time t = 0.  
The measure of effectiveness (MOE) is the number of killed target units for each 
opponent, unless stated otherwise 
A visual summary of interactions and parameters in this model appears in Figure 9. 
In this figure alive Blue units can be in one of three states: 𝑆𝐵, 𝐼𝐵 , 𝑅𝐵. Attrition from Blue 
goes to the (killed) state 𝐾𝐵. So 𝑆𝐵, 𝐼𝐵, 𝑅𝐵, 𝐾𝐵 and B are all dynamic in nature, but they all 
sum up to a constant, 𝐵0, the initial force size of Blue force. Specifically we have 𝐵 =
𝑆𝐵 + 𝐼𝐵 + 𝑅𝐵 and 𝐵0 = 𝐵 + 𝐾𝐵. Analogous mechanics govern Red force dynamics, 
represented in terms of Z. Note that this figure shows only positive values. Signs can be 
determined by the direction of the flow. 
 
 
 A two-sided Cyber Epidemic Combat model (General). Figure 9. 
Members of the Blue force (B) are in one of four states: susceptible (𝑆𝐵), infected (𝐼𝐵), 
recovered (𝑅𝐵), or killed (𝐾𝐵). Members of the Red force (Z) are represented similarly. 
Changes in states are represented by directed arrows, and the flow in dt is represented near 
arrows. 
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In the two-sided Cyber Epidemic Combat model, although attrition rates associated 
with infected or non-infected units are constant (𝜌𝑈, 𝜌𝐷 , 𝛽𝑈, 𝛽𝐷), the overall attrition rate is 
a weighted average of these constants, and the weights change with time. Table 1, displays 
the attrition rates. 
 
Overall change in force 
(Attrition) Without cyber effects With cyber effects 
𝑑𝐵
𝑑𝑡
 −𝜌𝑈 Z −𝜌𝑈 (𝑆𝑍 + 𝑅𝑍) − 𝜌𝐷 (𝐼𝑍) 
𝑑𝑍
𝑑𝑡
 − 𝛽𝑈 B − 𝛽𝑈 (𝑆𝐵 + 𝑅𝐵) − 𝛽𝐷 (𝐼𝐵) 
Table 1.   The attrition rates with and without the cyber effects. 
 
2. Compact Form of Two-sided Cyber Epidemic Combat Model  
A more compact form to represent the same model can be stated using the overall 
change. Appendix C discusses about the use of this representations in cyber epidemic 
combat model. We use (4.11) as (4.5)+(4.6)+(4.7), and (4.12)  as (4.8)+(4.9)+ (4.10).  
𝑑𝐵
𝑑𝑡
=  −𝜌𝑈(𝑆𝑍 + 𝑅𝑍) − 𝜌𝐷 (𝐼𝑍) , (4.11) 
𝑑𝑍
𝑑𝑡
=  − 𝛽𝑈(𝑆𝐵 + 𝑅𝐵) − 𝛽𝐷 (𝐼𝐵) , (4.12) 
𝑑𝑆𝐵
𝑑𝑡
= (−𝜉𝐵𝑆𝐵𝐼𝐵 − 𝜂𝐵𝑆𝐵𝑅𝐵) + 𝑑𝐵𝑑𝑡  𝑆𝐵𝐵 , (4.13) 
𝑑𝐼𝐵
𝑑𝑡
 = (+𝜉𝐵𝐼𝐵𝑆𝐵 − 𝜂𝐵𝐼𝐵𝑅𝐵) + 𝑑𝐵𝑑𝑡  𝐼𝐵𝐵 , (4.14) 
𝑑𝑅𝐵
𝑑𝑡
= (+𝜂𝐵𝑅𝐵𝑆𝐵 + 𝜂𝐵𝑅𝐵𝐼𝐵) + 𝑑𝐵𝑑𝑡 𝑅𝐵𝐵  , (4.15) 
𝑑𝑆𝑍
𝑑𝑡
= (−𝜉𝑍𝑆𝑍𝐼𝑍 − 𝜂𝑍𝑆𝑍𝑅𝑍) + 𝑑𝑍𝑑𝑡  𝑆𝑧𝑍  , (4.16) 
𝑑𝐼𝑍
𝑑𝑡
 = (+𝜉𝑍𝐼𝑍 𝑆𝑍 − 𝜂𝑍𝐼𝑍 𝑅𝑍) + 𝑑𝑍𝑑𝑡  𝐼𝑧𝑍  , (4.17) 
𝑑𝑅𝑍
𝑑𝑡
= (+𝜂𝑍𝑅𝑍𝑆𝑍 + 𝜂𝑍𝑅𝑍𝐼𝑍) + 𝑑𝑍𝑑𝑡 𝑅𝑧𝑍  . (4.18) 
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 C. MIXED EPIDEMIC COMBAT MODEL EXPLORATION 
Begin by exploring the equations that represent the change in kinetic attack rate 
caused by cyber attack. Because cyber attacks and kinetic attacks have one common 
factor, and that is kinetic attack rate, cyber attack does not affect the battle with any effect 
except the effect on attack rate. Explaining the effects of cyber offensive and cyber 
defensive measures on kinetic attack rate would present insights about the overall picture. 
We continue with numerical explorations for each analytic discussion. 
1. Attack Rates 
The attack rate of Blue and the attrition rate of Red can be represented as: 
𝑑𝑍(𝑡)
𝑑𝑡
= − 𝛽𝑈   [𝑆𝐵(𝑡) + 𝑅𝐵(𝑡)]  −  𝛽𝐷  𝐼𝐵(𝑡) ,  
    = −𝛽𝑈   [𝐵(𝑡) − 𝐼𝐵(𝑡)]  −  𝛽𝐷  𝐼𝐵(𝑡) ,       ≡ −𝛽(𝑡)  𝐵(𝑡) ,    where 
𝛽(𝑡) = +𝛽𝑈  𝐵(𝑡)  −  𝛽𝑈  𝐼𝐵(𝑡) +  𝛽𝐷  𝐼𝐵(𝑡) 
𝐵(𝑡)  .  
Or: 
𝛽(𝑡) =  𝛽𝑈 − 𝐼𝐵(𝑡)𝐵(𝑡)   ( 𝛽𝑈 − 𝛽𝐷) ,    𝛽(𝑡) = 𝛽𝑈 − 𝐼𝐵𝛼(𝑡)   (𝛽𝑈 −  𝛽𝐷). (4.19) 
 
 
Here, 𝐼𝐵𝛼 is equal to the fraction of units in B that are infected at time t, and is 
scaled between 0 and 1. In addition, 𝐼𝐵𝛼 is dynamic, so ?̅? ( or  𝛽(𝑡) ) is a function of time, 
but we suppress time-dependency in notation for ease of display. We substitute ?̅? = 𝛽𝑈 −
𝐼𝐵
𝛼  (𝛽𝑈 − 𝛽𝐷), and ?̅? = 𝜌𝑈 − 𝐼𝑍𝛼(𝜌𝑈 −  𝜌𝐷). In the representation 𝛽𝑈 − 𝐼𝐵𝛼(𝛽𝑈 −  𝛽𝐷), the  
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attack rate of the Blue force is decreased with the proportion of infected in Blue, and the 
decrease in kinetic attack rate, based on the proposed model.  
Attrition of Red can be modeled without any cyber infection effect on attacker as:  
𝑑𝑍
𝑑𝑡
= −𝛽𝑈𝐵 . 
Now we can clearly see how a cyber infection in attacker units can affect attrition 
of the defender: 
   𝑑𝑍
𝑑𝑡
= −𝛽𝑈 𝐵 + (𝛽𝑈 −  𝛽𝐷) 𝐼𝐵. (4.20) 
In words, a cyber infection of the Blue force (B) degrades the instantaneous attack 
rate on the Red force (Z) by an amount that depends on the number of infected Blue units 
at time t and the difference in attrition rates between the infected and non-infected units. 
2. Cyber Operation Effects on Kinetic Attack Rates  
We used the bar representation to clarify the effects on attack rates as in the 
previous section as:  
?̅? =  𝛽𝑈 − 𝐼𝐵𝛼 (𝛽𝑈 − 𝛽𝐷) ,    
?̅? = 𝜌𝑈 − 𝐼𝑍𝛼  (𝜌𝑈 −  𝜌𝐷) ,      𝑑𝐵
𝑑𝑡
=  −?̅? 𝑍  , (4.21) 
 𝑑𝑍
𝑑𝑡
=  −?̅? 𝐵  . (4.22)  
We can summarize these effects in Table 2.   
 
Overall change in force 
(Attrition) 








− 𝛽𝑈 B −?̅?  B 
Table 2.   The change in models with and without the cyber effects, simplified. 
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A visual representation of the states and the parameters can be summarized as in 
Figure 10.  
 
 
 A two-sided Cyber Epidemic Combat model.  Figure 10. 
 
 
Figure 11 represents the model without any cyber effect. So comparison of  Figure 
10 and Figure 11 shows how the cyber effect changes the model. 
Figure 12 represents the model with cyber degraded attack rates. Thus,  Figure 10 
and Figure 12 are essentially the same. Comparing these two figures reveals how the 








 A Kinetic model with cyber effects.  Figure 12. 
 
These formulations reveal that the attack rate of Blue is decreased under cyber 
attack, in proportion to the ratio of infected Blue units to fighting Blue units and the 
difference of normal and decreased kinetic attack rate. This reinforces and quantifies the 
intuition that effectiveness of an infection (lower 𝛽𝐷) is as important as the spread 
capability of the infection. Similarly, any step to reduce the degradation of an infected unit 
is as important as any step to reduce the spread of the infection. On one hand, we assumed 
a constant decrease on the attack rate which causes a proportional decrease in cyber effect, 
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on the other hand, the spread of the infection accelerates with time, which causes the cyber 
effect to be more rapid initially. In this case, the spread speed of the infection has a 
dominant role. 
3. Numerical Exploration for Various Parameter Values 
We will now use our model to explore how forces behave with and without cyber 
infection. In the figures that follow, bold lines represent number of Blue and Red units 
(and total attritions). Note that, we increased the detail level in the graphs by using 10 
steps in 1 time (t), and to reproduce these figures, time should be divided by 10. 
We begin with the simple case where both sides are symmetric in initial size and 
capability. Figure 13 shows the Lanchester dynamics for a conventional aimed-fire battle 
without any cyber effect, along with a complete replication of model parameters. The 
dynamics display a conventional aimed-fire pattern. Because the two sides are symmetric, 
Red and Blue Forces annihilate one another. 
We next consider the case where only one side has a cyber capability 
(equivalently, the other side is the only one that suffers from a cyber infection). In Figure 
14 one side (Red) has one cyber-infected unit initially, and there is asymmetry in the 
initial conditions of the conventional combat. We can see how the cyber effect changes the 
total force sizes of Blue and Red.  
Figure 13 and Figure 14 clearly shows that a single infected unit may have a large 
effect on the battle outcome.  
Of course, it is not the presence of a cyber capability alone that leads to victory, 
but that may be an advantage of one side over the other. Figure 16 shows the case where 
both sides have an identical cyber capability; in this case, the model parameters are 









































(𝜂𝐵 , 𝜂𝑍) 
Blue  1000  950  0  50 0.10  0.01  0.0050  0.0005  
Red  1000  950  0  50 0.10 0.01  0.0050 0.0005 
 
 
 No initial infection of Blue or Red.  Figure 13. 
In this battle, initial parameters are the same for both sides. Since two sides are symmetric, 
Red and Blue annihilate one another. There is no cyber effect and the graph shows a 





































(𝜂𝐵 , 𝜂𝑍) 
Blue  1000  950  0  50 0.10  0.01  0.0050  0.0005  
Red  1000  949  1  50 0.10 0.01  0.0050 0.0005 
 
 
 Minimal initial infection on one side, Red. Figure 14. 
In this battle, initial parameters are the same except the number of infected. So, we can see 
the change in number of units when two equal (symmetric) forces fight, and one side 





































(𝜂𝐵 , 𝜂𝑍) 
Blue  1000  949  1  50 0.10  0.01  0.0050  0.0005  
Red  1000  949  1  50 0.10 0.01  0.0050 0.0005 
 
 
 Minimal initial infection on both sides. Figure 15. 
In this battle, initial parameters are the same for both sides, again. Two sides are 
symmetric, Red and Blue annihilate one another, but the graph shows a different pattern 
from a conventional aimed-fire. The difference is caused by the infections on both sides. 
(Time is multiplied by 10.) 
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A larger initial infection on one side accelerates the overall infection process and 
limits even more the fighting capability of that infected side. Figure 16 shows the case 
where 𝐼𝑍 = 50,  and there are fewer susceptibles (so the overall population size remains 
constant). Figure 17 shows the similar case where 𝐼𝑍 = 500,  all other conditions being 
equal. Although the infection happens faster, the overall battle time does not change 
significantly, and the results are qualitatively the same. 
Figure 18 considers the case where the initial infection is symmetric, i.e., 𝐼𝐵 =
𝐼𝑍 = 1, but where one force (Red) has a larger number of susceptibles, and therefore an 
overall larger force size. In this case, the advantage in a larger initial force size gives Red 
the victory, despite the fact that a larger force is a larger target. Greater disparity in the 
initial sizes of Blue and Red, as shown in Figure 19, makes the result even more dramatic. 
Specifically, we observe that between Figure 18 and Figure 19 there is about 9% 
difference in force for initial conditions. However, the results of the battle changed in 





































(𝜂𝐵 , 𝜂𝑍) 
Blue  1000  950  0  50 0.10  0.01  0.0050  0.0005  
Red  1000  900  50  50 0.10 0.01  0.0050 0.0005 
 
 
 Increased initial infection on Red, (50x). Figure 16. 
In this battle, initial parameters are the same except for the number of infected Red. We 
increased the number of infected by 50 times to see the difference. We see that Blue wins, 
but the increase does not change the outcome or time of battle significantly. (Time is 




































(𝜂𝐵 , 𝜂𝑍) 
Blue  1000  950  0  50 0.10  0.01  0.0050  0.0005  
Red  1000  450  500  50 0.10 0.01  0.0050 0.0005 
 
 
 Increased initial infection on Red, (500x). Figure 17. 
In this battle, initial parameters are the same except the number of infected. In the case 
where the number of infected is increased 500 times, we see that Blue wins again, but the 
increased level in infected, the outcome, and time of battle does not change significantly. 




































(𝜂𝐵 , 𝜂𝑍) 
Blue  1000  949  1  50 0.10  0.01  0.0050  0.0005  
Red  1051  1000  1  50 0.10 0.01  0.0050 0.0005 
 
 
 Increased initial susceptibles on Red (5%). Figure 18. 
In this battle, initial parameters are the same with infection, for both sides. We increase 
the initial number of susceptibles (and overall unit number) for Red by 5%. The difference 
in outcome caused by this increase is about 40% of initial, and is significantly higher than 




































(𝜂𝐵 , 𝜂𝑍) 
Blue  1000  949  1  50 0.10  0.01  0.0050  0.0005  
Red  1131  1080  1  50 0.10 0.01  0.0050 0.0005 
 
 
 Increased initial susceptibles on Red (13%). Figure 19. 
In this battle, to compare with Figure 18, we increase the initial number of susceptibles 
(and overall unit number) for Red by 13%. The difference in outcome caused by this 
increase is about 60% of initial. The marginal effects of initial number of units are 
decreasing, but still significant. (Time is multiplied by 10.) 
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 We use the scenario in Figure 19 (symmetric initial infections, but a larger fighting 
force for Red) to explore tradeoffs in other model parameters. 
In Figure 20 we decrease the patch (recovery) rate from 0.0005 to 0.0003 (a 40% 
reduction ) there is a significant change on the number of survivors. However, in Figure 
21 when we decrease the patch rate from 0.0005 to 0.0002 (a 60% reduction), we see that 
the victorious side changes. As shown in Figure 22 with a patch rate of .0002788 (a 45% 
reduction), the outcome of the battle is a draw. So, overall a 45% decrease in patch rate 
has approximately the same effect as a 13% decrease in force level. We should note that 
these estimates are for given parameters on given points. 
In Figure 23, we use the same method to see the effects of the spread rate, 
however, the effect of the spread rate is not very significant. The marginal effect of each 
additional infected unit (on the battle outcome) decreases as initial number of infected 
units increase, and after a point any addition to spread rate or initial infected unit does not 
affect (insignificant) the overall course of the battle. In this case comparing with Figure 19 
increasing the spread rate by 160 times is not enough to change the victorious side, 
In Figure 24 we try to get the same type of result as in Figure 22 by decreasing the 
initial number of recovered this time, by keeping the patch rates the same with Figure 19. 
We see that a 72% decrease in number of initial recovered units has the same effect as a  






































(𝜂𝐵 , 𝜂𝑍) 
Blue  1000  949  1  50 0.10  0.01  0.0050  0.0005  
Red  1131  1080  1  50 0.10 0.01  0.0050 0.0003 
 
 
 Increased initial susceptibles and 40% decreased patch rate within Red. Figure 20. 
In this battle, to compare with Figure19, we decrease the patch rate for Red by 40%. The 
difference in outcome caused by this decrease is about 40% of initial. We see that patch 




































(𝜂𝐵 , 𝜂𝑍) 
Blue  1000  949  1  50 0.10  0.01  0.0050  0.0005  
Red  1131  1080  1  50 0.10 0.01  0.0050 0.0002 
 
 
 Increased initial susceptibles and decreased patch rate within Red. Figure 21. 
In this battle, to compare with Figure 19, we decrease the patch rate for Red by 60%. The 
difference in outcome caused by this decrease is very large. We see that patch rate 




































(𝜂𝐵 , 𝜂𝑍) 
Blue  1000  949  1  50 0.10  0.01  0.0050  0.0005  
Red  1131  1080  1  50 0.10 0.01  0.0050 .0002788 
 
 
 Increased initial susceptibles and decreased patch rate within Red. Figure 22. 
For this battle, we compare with Figure 15, because results are the same. Comparing to the 
initial symmetric battle, we increased the number of Red units by 13%, and decrease the 




































(𝜂𝐵 , 𝜂𝑍) 
Blue  1000  949  1  50 0.10  0.01  0.0050  0.0005  
Red  1131  1080  1  50 0.10 0.01  0.8000 0.0005 
 
 
 Increased initial susceptibles and increased spread rate within Red (160x). Figure 23. 
For this battle, we compare with Figure 15, because results are similar. Comparing to the 
initial symmetric battle, we increased the number of units by 13%, and increased the 
infection rate for Red by 160 times. The result is slightly in favor of Red. So, the spread 




































(𝜂𝐵 , 𝜂𝑍) 
Blue  1000  949  1  50 0.10  0.01  0.0050  0.0005  
Red  1131  1116  1  14 0.10 0.01  0.0050 0.0005 
 
 
 Increased initial susceptibles and decreased recovered on Red. Figure 24. 
For this battle, we compare with Figure 15, because results are the same. Comparing to the 
initial symmetric battle, we increased the number of units by 13%, and decrease the initial 
number of recovered for Red by 72%. The battle result is a draw again. (Time is 
multiplied by 10.) 
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4. Numerical Exploration for Attack Rates 
To solve the differential equations numerically, we used the programming 
language “R” (Ihaka and Gentleman, 1996) as the main software with the DeSolve 
Package (Soetaert et al., 2010) to estimate the point at which one side is annihilated (the 
root of one of the two equations). No step-size was declared for the solver. Due to the 
model structure, force numbers may go negative unless stopped at the zero boundary. 
Attack rates are at the core of this study. It is the common parameter linking cyber 
and kinetic attacks. The victory is driven by the result of the kinetic battle, so by number 
of units ultimately. The result of a kinetic battle is driven by two sets: numbers of units, 
and attack rates. However, cyber attacks have no direct effect on number of surviving 
units, it just affects the attack rates. So cyber attacks can change the course of a battle by 
affecting the attack rates.  
Attack rates are assumed to be constant in a kinetic-only battle, as in original 
Lanchester equations. Cyber operations cause these rates to fluctuate in time for the 
deterministic models. We have shown that the decrease in attack rate is directly related to 
the fraction of attacker units infected. We will further discuss how these fluctuations may 
affect victory conditions and how cyber operations can be a decisive action in a combat in 
Section IV.C.8. 
We showed how cyber and kinetic attack rates can change by shock in Chapter III, 
in a discrete manner. This chapter explores the same content in a continuous manner. 
Thus, in Figure 25, we see how one cyber-capable side can change the attack rate of its 
adversary over time with the mixed epidemic combat model.  
Figure 26 shows the change in attack rates when both sides have cyber attack 
capabilities, and gives a sample for the interaction between them.  
Overall, in Figure 25 one side is infected, and in Figure 26 both sides are infected. 





 A notional attack rate graph, Blue is under infected by Red. Figure 25. 
Red is not infected. 
 
 
 A notional attack rate graph, each side is infected by the other side. Figure 26. 
  
In Figure  27 we can see that 𝛽(𝑡) = 𝛽𝑈 − 𝐼𝐵𝛼 (𝛽𝑈 − 𝛽𝐷) was decreased by a cyber 
operation, and 𝜌 is constant. Although Red here has a significantly lower attack rate (𝜌), 
Blue attack rate 𝛽(𝑡) can be forced to be lower than 𝜌 depending on other parameters. 
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With optimum cyber capabilities, Red can have attack rate superiority for long enough, 
which may lead to combat victory. 
The underlying situation in Figure 27 is that although both forces start with the 
same number of units, Blue was infected by Red immediately after the battle starts. The 
infection spreads 10 times faster than it is cured in susceptibles, but Blue forces can patch 
both infected units and susceptibles. The infection decreases the kinetic attack capability 
to 10% of initial. The infection does not last more than 20% of the battle time when we 
run the model, but changes the result of the battle.   
 
 A notional attack rate graph, Blue is under cyber attack by Red.  Figure 27. 
Number of initial units in this figure is the same. Although the initial kinetic attack rate of 
Blue is significantly higher than Red’s attack rate, Blue is quickly infected by Red. The 
result of the battle is a draw. 
 
5. Numerical Sensitivity Analysis of Parameters 
To understand the effects of parameters on the overall battle result, we numerically 
conduct sensitivity analyses. Since the model uses several parameters, we fix each 
parameter and vary two of them each time to have a two-dimensional visual 
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representation. This approach restricts us to a very specific range, but may help to gain 
insight. 
We represent blue color when Blue force wins, and red color when Red force wins. 
The parameters are fixed as Table 3 except two analyzed ones, which are specified in the 
figure. The parameters are symmetric unless stated otherwise. We display the results in 
Figure 29. 
When comparing infection spread rates, 𝜉𝐵 and 𝜉𝑍, the result is intuitive. We use 
the range (0, 0.02) for both parameters, and because we assume two symmetric forces in 
the experiment, depending on two symmetric parameters, the graph is also symmetric. So 
if Blue force was infected by a more powerful infection, then the spread rate in Blue (𝜉𝐵) 
would be higher, which would lead Red to win. The same conditions apply to Blue. 
When comparing the infection spread rate of Blue, 𝜉𝐵,, and the patch (recovery) 
rate of Blue ,𝜂𝐵 , we observe a non-linear interaction for these two parameters. Using the 
range (0, 0.004) for 𝜂𝐵 and (0, 0.04) for 𝜉𝐵, we see that 𝜂𝐵 has a dominant effect over 𝜉𝐵. 
The underlying reason for this may be the marginal effect of 𝜉𝐵, which decreases when the 
spread rate 𝜉𝐵 gets larger. 
We also compare the infection spread rate of Blue, 𝜉𝐵,  and the patch (recovery) 
rate of Red, 𝜂𝑍, and we see a different pattern. These two parameters may seem unrelated, 
but in a highly-interactive environment they should be. We use the range (0, 0.002) for 𝜂𝑍  
and (0, 0.02) for 𝜉𝐵. The graph shows that they are related in a non-linear way. One point 
to consider is that this graph is not symmetric, and parameters have different effects. The 
interaction between these two parameters shows that these two parameters affect the battle 
results in the same way. Decreasing any of these parameters will cause Blue to win. Since 
we can explain 𝜂𝑍 as cyber defensive effectiveness of Red and 𝜉𝐵 as cyber offensive 
effectiveness of Red, they affect the battle in the same direction. Also, we can see that 𝜂𝑍 
has a higher relative threshold than 𝜉𝐵, which gives the same result with the analytical 
approach.  
Finally, we compare the number of recovered Blue (𝑅𝐵) with number of infected 
Blue (𝐼𝐵). This time, unlike the other three comparisons, we compare the number of units 
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instead of rates. We use a range (0, 200) for both state variables. In this case, the number 
of Red forces is constant and equal to 1000. The number of Blue forces, however is not 
constant and changes due to other state variables. Comparing these two factors, we see 
another non-linear interaction. The interaction between these two state variables comes 
from the tradeoff between the total size of the Blue fighting force, and the effect of cyber 
attack on Blue. Noting that initial Red size is constant in all the points in this figure, when 
infected size gets larger, the total fighting force gets larger, too. This affects the overall 




































(𝜂𝐵 , 𝜂𝑍) 
Blue  1000  949  1  50 0.10  0.01  0.0050  0.0005  
Red  1000  949  1  50 0.10 0.01  0.0050 0.0005 
Table 3.   Base parameters for numerical sensitivity analysis figures 
Figure 29 is based on this table. The range of parameters are specified on each graph. 
    
 
    
 Numerical analysis pairs. Figure 28. 
Each graph uses parameters from Table 3. The sensitivity range is specified on each graph.  
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6. Dynamic State Equations 
Starting again with equation (4.11 - 4.18) we follow the steps specified in 















  . (4.23) 
 

















All initial states (𝑆0, 𝐼0, 𝑅0) belong to B. Note that the state variables and 
parameters should be positive, and c is constant. 
Equation (4.23) and equation (4.24) are different representations of the model. We 
keep these equations for different interpretations. 
These dynamic state equations provide a solid background to show effects of cyber 
operations, considering the given spread model. We should keep in mind that B is the 
driver here, and may decrease over time by the kinetic effect. So as the ratio 𝐵
𝐵0
 drops from 
an initial value of 1 and approaches 0, all other states are affected by this. Without an 
attrition effect on B, the term 𝐵
𝐵0
 will be constant (e.g., 1), and the other states will be 
balanced by these equations. If we know or model the change of ratio 𝐵
𝐵0
 by an outside 
model (i.e., kinetic attrition), we can understand the infection level at any time, by given 
initial conditions. 
Equation (4.23) shows a clear picture for changes on B. Yet it represents the 
changes within B explicitly, but depends on other factors such as Z for overall change of B 




 is 1. Also assume that 𝜉 = 𝜂. In that case, we see the same result with Schramm 
and Gaver (2013) closed form of I(t), which uses the same assumption. 
Equation (4.24) shows that the ratio of B to 𝐵0 is inversely related to the ratio of I 
to 𝐼0. Again the ratio of B to 𝐵0 is directly related to the ratio of R to 𝑅0 and to the ratio of 
S to 𝑆0. These calculations would hold outside of asymptote limits. With this equation we 
see that, change in the value of 𝐵 affects 𝑅𝐵 , attack rates, spread rates and patch rates in 
different ways. 
Equation (4.24) supports a basis for a cost estimation comparison for cyber 
operation effects. We conclude that the value of R affects the overall combat proportional 
to fraction, whereas the ratio of rates affects the combat exponentially. 
7. Cyber Pandemic Threshold 
The maximum time of infection is an important breakpoint. We will discuss this 
issue further in this section. As discussed in Schramm and Gaver (2013) under the 
assumptions 𝛽 = 𝜌 = 0,  𝜉 = 𝜂  the maximum infection time is: 
 𝒕𝑰𝑩 𝒎𝒂𝒙 = 𝟏𝟐𝝃𝑩𝟎 𝒍𝒏[    (𝑺𝟎 +  𝑰𝟎) 𝑺𝟎     (𝑹𝟎 +  𝑰𝟎) 𝑹𝟎 ] (4.25) 
 
If we want to estimate time of maximum infected ratio from the start of the battle, 
we can assume that 𝐼0 ≪ 𝑅0 ≪  𝑆0 , and take 𝐼0 as a small number (e.g., 1). Approximating  
𝑩𝟎 = 𝑺𝟎 + 𝑹𝟎 , that will lead us to:     𝒕𝑰𝑩 𝒎𝒂𝒙 ≅ 𝟏𝝃 (𝑺𝟎 + 𝑹𝟎)  𝒍𝒏 �  𝑺𝟎  𝑹𝟎 � ;    𝒍𝒏 �  𝑺𝟎  𝑹𝟎 � ,  𝑰𝟎 > 0 (4.26) 
 
If we fix the fraction 𝑩𝟎
𝑹𝟎
= 𝑘, we can summarize the equation as: 
 𝐭𝐈𝐁 𝐦𝐚𝐱 ≅ 𝟏𝛏 𝑘 𝑹𝟎  𝐥𝐧[𝑘 − 1];    𝐥𝐧[k − 1] > 1 (4.27) 
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We can interpret this equation in several ways.  
First, from (4.26) we observe that 𝑡𝐼𝐵 𝑚𝑎𝑥 decreases inversely as rate of infection 
spread rate 𝜉 increases. That means if 𝜉 is doubled, t will be ½ of the original; and if 𝜉 is 
increased by 10 times, t will be 1/10 of the original.  
The second and less intuitive result from Eq. (4.25) is that 𝑅0 acts the same way. 
So if the initial recovered size is increased by 10 times, t will be 1/10 of the original, also.  
Third, the ratio of   𝑆0  
𝑅0
 is also important; so if it is closer to one, t will be closer to 
zero.  
In most cases we can assume to have 𝑅0 ≪  𝑆0 and  𝐼0 =1. By this assumption we 
can see how well maintained (𝑅0) (regular updates, virus and ID protection, etc.) and 
poorly maintained units can degrade the response to a cyber attack, thus affecting the 
combat outcome. 
Another way to approach the spread of infection is to find the pandemic (epidemic) 
threshold, which is a lower limit on some attributes of the infection and the cure that 
indicates how the spread grows throughout the population. The pandemic threshold differs 
for each epidemic, and is an indicator to foresee when the epidemic grows and when it 
starts to shrink. Using a differential definition of cyber infection spread to original 
equation in (4.6), we can summarize the situation in B as : 
  𝑑𝐼𝐵
𝑑𝑡
 = (+𝜉𝐵𝐼𝐵𝑆𝐵 − 𝜂𝐵𝐼𝐵𝑅𝐵) > 0 (4.28) 
 
Thus, the threshold is:  
𝜉𝐵𝐼𝐵𝑆𝐵 > 𝜂𝐵𝐼𝐵𝑅𝐵       𝜉𝐵𝑆𝐵 > 𝜂𝐵𝑅𝐵 
   𝑆𝐵𝑅𝐵 > 𝜂𝐵𝜉𝐵 (4.29) 
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Since 𝑆𝐵 and 𝑅𝐵 are dynamic in nature, we can interpret that the infection will 
grow until the ratio of 𝑆𝐵
𝑅𝐵
  decreases to the constant  𝜂𝐵
𝜉𝐵
. As was explained previously, 
when 𝜉 = 𝜂 is assumed, the threshold becomes 𝑆𝐵 > 𝑅𝐵, and holds with former 
calculations. 
Also, we can interpret that the infected size will increase until some point at time, 
and then will start to decrease. The time that the sign changes is 𝒕𝑰𝑩 𝒎𝒂𝒙 and we can come 
up with an equation as: SB(𝒕𝑰𝑩 𝒎𝒂𝒙)RB(𝒕𝑰𝑩 𝒎𝒂𝒙) = ηBξB  
 
In most cases the infected side may not know the spread rate of the infection. But 
as well may estimate the patch rate, number of patched and roughly number of 
susceptibles. So assuming that infection spread rate is constant, the infection will spread if 
 ξB > ηB RBSB  . (4.30) 
In this case, Eq. (4.30) says that RB
SB




 is larger than ξB, the epidemic starts shrinking. This shows that regardless of 
the patch rate, if a force keeps a high ratio of recovered units or low ratio of susceptible 
units (i.e., by constantly updating cyber infrastructure), it would be highly unlikely to 
spread a disease and cause significant degradation.  
8. Cyber Operation Effects on Victory Conditions  
We explore cyber epidemic combat models for different objectives, but the main 
objective is to be able to understand and interpret the effects on battle outcome.  
To set the base for victory conditions, we will use the number of survivors in 
kinetic combat. Thus, the dynamic state equation of kinetic battle can be used to evaluate 
the number of survivors. So, following the steps from (2.1) and (2.2) we see the closed 




 > � 𝜌 𝛽�1 2� , and ends in a draw if   𝐵0𝑍0  = � 𝜌 𝛽�1 2�  in a battle without cyber effects. 
We will use the same steps in order to find how cyber operations affect the conditions for 
victory. 
Using B as the number of remaining Blue forces at time t, 𝑍 as the number of 
remaining Red forces at time t,  𝛽�  as the effective attack rate of Blue at time t, and  𝜌�   as 
the effective attack rate of Red at time t, we can estimate victory conditions at time t. Note 
that this is a dynamic process, and the victorious side can change during the battle time, 
depending on given parameters. The intention here is not to estimate the winner regarding 
the initial conditions (which is not possible with these calculations), but is to understand 
how these parameters affect the battle results. Also, this calculation will reveal whether 
keeping the current conditions for attack rates at time t for the rest of the battle would lead 
to victory or not. Blue wins the battle as long as 
 𝑩
𝒁
> �  𝝆�  𝜷� �𝟏 𝟐�  (4.31) 
Another important question is how long one side must keep cyber superiority in 
order to win. We will look for a sample situation where Blue is defeated. Then we will 
increase the Blue’s defensive cyber operation effectiveness (𝜂𝐵) to see if Blue is 
victorious.  
Following figures represent a sample comparison for two sides, with Blue exposed 
to cyber operations. Initial force ratio is 1, so victory of forces depends solely on attack 
rates. The shaded area is when Blue wins, (respectively, the white area is when Red wins), 
if we were to keep Blue’s attrition rate at a value in the shaded area (respectively the white 
area) for the remainder of the combat.  
In the controlled numerical experiment, we keep every condition the same and set 
𝜂𝐵= 0.0002 for Figure 29, and set 𝜂𝐵= 0.0003 for Figure 30. Surprisingly, even this small 
change can lead to the turnover of the victory in the battle. Various graphs can be 
produced by trial, but this single experiment tells enough for the importance of cyber 
operations.  
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Figure 29 summarizes the attack rates for a kinetic battle which Red wins. We see 
that Red wins the kinetic battle when the infected units were high in ratio in Blue, because 
its attacking power was affected significantly. We can conclude that if Red is able to 
prevent Blue from recovering or if Blue did not invest in cleaning the infection, the battle 
would result differently.  
Figure 30 summarizes the attack rates for the same battle (same parameters) when 
Blue was able to increase its cyber infection patch rate by 50% and win the kinetic battle.  
Shaded regions are the conditions (at time t) where Blue is victorious at the end of 
the battle, and white regions are for Red. 
These discussions are intended to answer some questions about the effects of time 
of shock, time of recovery, and the size of the forces at these times. We explored what can 
affect victory conditions, but the methods used in this chapter represent just one way to 
uncover these questions, and there are various other ways to do it. We have assumptions 
regarding to epidemic model and combat model which affects the course of discussions. 
Specific scenarios used for numerical experiments explain proposed models in these 
specific conditions. There are various ways to change and extend the topics discussed in 
this section, and we will give some examples in next chapter for several different model 





































(𝜂𝐵 , 𝜂𝑍) 
Blue  1000  949  1  50 0.10  0.01  0.0050  0.0002  





 Change of attack rates  Figure 29. 






































(𝜂𝐵 , 𝜂𝑍) 
Blue  1000  949  1  50 0.10  0.01  0.0050  0.0003  





 Change of attack rates with 50% increased effective infection Figure 30. 




V. PROPOSED EXTENSIONS TO DISCUSSED MODELS 
In Chapter IV, we explored some of the attributes of the basic cyber epidemic 
combat model. In this chapter, we consider different attributes of a cyber attack process 
and try to expand the model along with these considerations. In order to combine the 
kinetic battle with cyber operations, the model discussed in Chapter IV needs to be 
adjusted time-wise. This is because events can happen faster in cyberspace as compared to 
kinetic space (Andress and Winterfeld 2013). In other words, we differentiate cyber time 
with kinetic battle time. We use scaled-cyber time in the study first to introduce new 
aspects with normalized values, and non-scaled cyber time after that for time 
considerations. These models propose only a way to represent a certain attribute, and there 
are several more ways to model these attributes, and also there are several more attributes.  
As discussed in Schramm and Gaver (2013) and explained in Andress and 
Winterfeld (2013) time-scale can be an issue when combining kinetic attacks and cyber 
attacks. We categorize the extensions into two main parts; as scaled time discussions, and 
non-scaled time discussions. Time scale especially affects dynamic calculations, which 
were discussed in Chapter IV. The calculations for cyber infection spread may be even 
unnecessary because of the different time scales with cyber battle and kinetic battle. If the 
cyber infection time is not in sync (or not scaled) with kinetic battle time, this will cause 
two possible outcomes: either the kinetic battle outcome is dominated by infection 
regardless of changes in rates and numbers, or it is not affected at all. In contrast, if the 
kinetic battle time is scaled to cyber time, the battle will be affected anyway, but the effect 
will be dependent on some factors, such as infection spread rates, number of infected 
units, etc.  
Although we proposed various extensions to the basic model in this chapter, such 
as adding different intrusion times, defense capabilities or adding a second type of 
infection to the system, due to time constraints in this study we leave it to the reader to 
obtain numerical results. Saying that these are some proposed models, intended to explain 
some different aspects of cyber operations, these extensions need to be analyzed both 
analytically and numerically in detail. 
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A. SCALED CYBER TIME – KINETIC COMBAT TIME 
In this part, we explore different extensions to the base model, constructed in 
Chapter IV. We introduce different coefficients and modifications to the model depending 
on attack/ defense type. We introduce one expression for each model on top of the base 
model. These extensions work properly if all states are positive. For purposes of 
exposition, we suppress time-dependence notation, e.g., 𝑆𝐵 = 𝑆𝐵(𝑡). Note that these 
figures show only positive values. Signs can be determined by the direction of flow. 
 
1. The Base Case 
As a reminder to the reader, here we summarize the model and parameters in the 
base case scenario from Chapter IV. We then extend the base case scenario by introducing 
new terms to represent different scenarios of interest. 
B   : level of Blue force at time t 
Z   : level of Red force at time t 
𝜉𝐵   : Infection spread rate within B 
𝜂𝐵   : Infection patch rate within B 
𝜉𝑍   : Infection spread rate within Z 
𝜂𝑍   : Infection patch rate within Z 
𝜌𝑈, 𝜌𝐷  : Normal attack rate, and decreased (by infection) attack rate of Z on B  
𝛽𝑈, 𝛽𝐷  : Normal attack rate, and decreased (by infection) attack rate of B on Z 
 
 
 A two-sided Cyber epidemic combat model.   Figure 31. 
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2. Intrusion Rate  
In Chapter IV, we explored the importance of the first infection on the overall 
system dynamics and battle outcome. We now introduce a new term to represent this 
initial infection. Specifically, we define the following. 
𝜃𝐵   : Infection start (intrusion) rate within B 
𝜃𝑍   : Infection start (intrusion) rate within Z 
 
 A two-sided Cyber epidemic combat model with intrusion rates. Figure 32. 
 
The new term 𝜃𝐵 represents the intrusion rate to Blue in order to start an infection. 
This is a crucial term to estimate effectiveness of defensive actions of B and can be 
estimated from real data on cyber penetration tests on combat units.  
The Blue Forces is infiltrated and infected at the rate of 𝜃𝐵 in a given timeframe. 
Since penetration is the toughest part of a cyber attack, this rate is different from the 
spread rate and in general should be much smaller.  
We formulate the dynamics for the one-sided model only to simplify this process; 
the other side will be symmetric. 
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Equation Section (Next) 
𝑑𝐵
𝑑𝑡
=  −?̅? 𝑍 (5.1)  
𝑑𝑆𝐵
𝑑𝑡
= (−𝜉𝐵𝑆𝐵𝐼𝐵 − 𝜃𝐵𝑆𝐵 − 𝜂𝐵𝑆𝐵𝑅𝐵) + 𝑑𝐵𝑑𝑡  𝑆𝐵𝐵  (5.2)  
𝑑𝐼𝐵
𝑑𝑡
 = (+𝜉𝐵𝐼𝐵𝑆𝐵 + 𝜃𝐵𝑆𝐵 − 𝜂𝐵𝐼𝐵𝑅𝐵) + 𝑑𝐵𝑑𝑡  𝐼𝐵𝐵 (5.3)  
𝑑𝑅𝐵
𝑑𝑡
= (+𝜂𝐵𝑅𝐵𝑆𝐵 + 𝜂𝐵𝑅𝐵𝐼𝐵) + 𝑑𝐵𝑑𝑡 𝑅𝐵𝐵  (5.4) 
 
We may use intrusion rate in our model for a more realistic approach. In real 
world, unlike in our model in chapter IV, the first infected unit can be found and patched 
before spreading the infection in the adversary, which would affect the course of the 
battle. On the other hand, there would be multiple intrusions in a cyber attack to make sure 
the infection spreads. We may represent these two actions with 𝜃𝐵. 
Second, representing the intrusion rate separately will allow us to assess how it 
affects a cyber attack. Note that there are special designed simulations to represent cyber 
intrusion to systems. So, gathering data and comparing the model with the data is an area 
of interest, which is very applicable. 
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3. Defense Rate  
A cyber defensive action can be modeled in different ways, depending on the 
nature of the cyber operation. The main subdivisions can be passive defense and active 
defense. We propose two different approaches for these two types of defensive actions. 
a. Constant Defense Rate 
In the context of a mixed-epidemic model, passive defense means that B can 
reduce the spread of an infection at a constant rate using passive defensive actions, i.e., 
firewall, automated virus protection programs, automated network transfer reductions, etc. 
These actions generally use automated procedures with dedicated resources or out-
sourcing. We assume these actions do not affect the kinetic attack rate, are not related to 
the number of fighting units, and are reducing the spread as a constant rate alone, if that is 
positive. To reflect this dynamic in our system equations, we introduce the following 
terms.  
𝜸𝑩   : Threat detection rate of B 
𝜸𝒁   : Threat detection rate of Z 
 
 A two-sided Cyber epidemic combat model with constant defensive action. Figure 33. 
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=  −?̅? 𝑍 (5.5) 
  𝑑𝑆𝐵
𝑑𝑡
= (−𝜉𝐵𝑆𝐵𝐼𝐵 + 𝛾𝐵 − 𝜂𝐵𝑆𝐵𝑅𝐵) + 𝑑𝐵𝑑𝑡  𝑆𝐵𝐵  (5.6) 
  𝑑𝐼𝐵
𝑑𝑡
 = (+𝜉𝐵𝐼𝐵𝑆𝐵 − 𝛾𝐵 − 𝜂𝐵𝐼𝐵𝑅𝐵) + 𝑑𝐵𝑑𝑡  𝐼𝐵𝐵  (5.7) 
  𝑑𝑅𝐵
𝑑𝑡
= (+𝜂𝐵𝑅𝐵𝑆𝐵 + 𝜂𝐵𝑅𝐵𝐼𝐵) + 𝑑𝐵𝑑𝑡 𝑅𝐵𝐵  (5.8) 
 
Note that the intention here is adding the model the effects of automated processes 
for cyber systems. These processes require a certain amount of resource, which will be 
used to reduce the spread of infection. Also, if the infection spread is not fast enough and 
if it does not consume all of these automated resources, these will be used to clean the 
infected units. Cleaning the infection by an automated process is not patching the unit, but 
is taking away the degrading effect, so that these units are susceptibles and can be infected 




b. Active Defense Rate  
In contrast to passive defense, active defensive actions generally use some 
resources related to the fighting force, and the use of these resources detracts from the 
kinetic capability of the force. To be more specific, active defense of Blue constricts use 
of cyber-related parts (i.e., communication devices, navigation devices, headquarter 
computers) in order to reduce the spread of infection in Blue, which slows down the cyber 
infection spread as well as slowing down the patch updates in Blue. However, this 
measure reduces the kinetic attack rate of Blue also, because the cyber defender (Blue)  
restriction of use of cyber-related parts may as well reduce fighting capability of cyber 
defender as well as reducing spread of cyber infection.  
 
ΤB   : Information process rate of B (0 ≤ ΤB ≤ 1) 
 







=  −?̅? 𝑍, 𝑑𝑍
𝑑𝑡
=  −?̅? 𝐵 𝑇𝐵 (5.9)   𝑑𝑆𝐵
𝑑𝑡
= (−𝜉𝐵𝑆𝐵𝐼𝐵 − 𝜂𝐵𝑆𝐵𝑅𝐵) 𝑇𝐵 + 𝑑𝐵𝑑𝑡  𝑆𝐵𝐵  (5.10)   𝑑𝐼𝐵
𝑑𝑡
 = (+𝜉𝐵𝐼𝐵𝑆𝐵 − 𝜂𝐵𝐼𝐵𝑅𝐵) 𝑇𝐵 + 𝑑𝐵𝑑𝑡  𝐼𝐵𝐵  (5.11)   𝑑𝑅𝐵
𝑑𝑡
= (+𝜂𝐵𝑅𝐵𝑆𝐵 + 𝜂𝐵𝑅𝐵𝐼𝐵) 𝑇𝐵 + 𝑑𝐵𝑑𝑡 𝑅𝐵𝐵  (5.12)   𝑑𝑆𝑍
𝑑𝑡
= (−𝜉𝑍𝑆𝑍𝐼𝑍 − 𝜂𝑍𝑆𝑍𝑅𝑍) + 𝑑𝑍𝑑𝑡  𝑆𝑍𝑍  (5.13)   𝑑𝐼𝑍
𝑑𝑡
 = (+𝜉𝑍𝐼𝑍 𝑆𝑍 − 𝜂𝑍𝐼𝑍 𝑅𝑍) + 𝑑𝑍𝑑𝑡  𝐼𝑍𝑍  (5.14)   𝑑𝑅𝑍
𝑑𝑡
= (+𝜂𝑍𝑅𝑍𝑆𝑍 + 𝜂𝑍𝑅𝑍𝐼𝑍) + 𝑑𝑍𝑑𝑡 𝑅𝑍𝑍  (5.15) 
 
The variable defense rate of Blue (ΤB) models the information process rate in case 
of a cyber attack. If the infection spread is high, reducing the process rate to 0 will stop the 
spread of the infection, and the cure of the infection, and can be considered at max 
protection from a cyber attack level with a trade-off on reducing communication, and 
decreasing the kinetic attack rate to 0. Keeping the rate at 1 will not have any effect on 
cyber attack and can be considered as weakest cyber protection, but the kinetic attack will 
not be affected by reduced information process, also. 
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4. Intelligence Level of Cyber Attacker 
We are interested in the situation where an attacker (Red) has an intelligence level 
of which members of Blue are in state R in defender (Blue). So, the attacker wants to aim 
for just for those Blues that are in state R instead of overall Blue forces, to not to kill 
infected units and susceptibles. We introduce a new expression (𝜇𝐵) to model this 
situation.  
The expression 𝜇𝐵 represents the level of intelligence distinguishing 𝑅𝐵. So, if 𝜇𝐵 
is set to 0, it means that the attacker has no specific information about 𝑅𝐵 and aims at Blue 
as a whole as in the basic model. If 𝜇𝐵 is set to 1, it means that the attacker has perfect 
information about 𝑅𝐵 and aims only at 𝑅𝐵, and causes no attrition on 𝑆𝐵 or 𝐼𝐵. Any 
intelligence level between 0 and 1 can be used in the model.  
We will formulate one side to simplify this process, and the other side will be 
symmetric. 
𝝁𝑩   : Attacker’s intelligence level on state 𝑅𝐵 (0 ≤ 𝝁𝑩 ≤ 1) 
 
 
 A notional figure about using intelligence level. Figure 35. 





=  −?̅? 𝑍 (5.16) 
  𝑑𝑆𝐵
𝑑𝑡
= (−𝜉𝐵𝑆𝐵𝐼𝐵 − 𝜂𝐵𝑆𝐵𝑅𝐵) + 𝑑𝐵𝑑𝑡 (1 − 𝜇𝐵) 𝑆𝐵𝐵  (5.17) 
  𝑑𝐼𝐵
𝑑𝑡
 = (+𝜉𝐵𝐼𝐵𝑆𝐵 − 𝜂𝐵𝐼𝐵𝑅𝐵) + 𝑑𝐵𝑑𝑡 (1 − 𝜇𝐵) 𝐼𝐵𝐵  (5.18) 
  𝑑𝑅𝐵
𝑑𝑡
= (+𝜂𝐵𝑅𝐵𝑆𝐵 + 𝜂𝐵𝑅𝐵𝐼𝐵) + 𝑑𝐵𝑑𝑡 ((1 − 𝜇𝐵) 𝑅𝐵𝐵 + 𝜇𝐵) (5.19) 
 
This model can be used to represent a phase, if the cyber attacker wants to spread 
the infection, and the intention is to first clear the recovered units, and then focus on to 
susceptible units and infected units. This may be the case when the adversary has a limited 
size of recovered units, which can be completely killed in a short time. 
Another use area may be the one if the cyber attack is very effective about 
reducing the kinetic capability of the adversary, and can spread fast enough, but the 
kinetic attack costs (or risks) are high.  
The common point in these two cases is the aim to spread the infection, whether to 
collect intelligence, or to reduce kinetic attack capability of the adversary. 
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5. Use of White Population for DDoS Attack 
This is a model for Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack, which uses 
infection spread in another network. A DDoS attack is an indirect attack type, which 
intends to decrease the usable capacity of communication networks by sending constant 
messages and by generating a heavy burden of unnecessary message traffic. So, DDoS 
networks (or botnets) attack a given target with brutal cyber force as a physical attack and 
reduce the capacity to communicate.  
We simplified the B states to Working (𝑊𝐵) and Disabled (𝐷𝐵). 𝐷𝐵 + 𝑊𝐵 = 𝐵 We 
assume Disabled B cannot communicate any other units; thus, it is ineffective. So, 𝛽𝐷= 0 
in this case. We will use 𝛽𝑈 as ?̅?. 
 W Population : Cyber attack capability (Being used unintentionally) 
𝑊𝐵   : Working units in B 
𝐷𝐵   : Disabled units in B 
 







=  −?̅? 𝑍   (5.20)  
 𝑑𝑍
𝑑𝑡
= −𝛽𝑈(𝑊𝐵) (5.21)   𝑑𝑊𝐵
𝑑𝑡
= (−𝜉𝐵𝑊𝐵𝐼𝑊 + 𝜂𝐵𝑊𝐵) + 𝑑𝐵𝑑𝑡  𝑊𝐵𝐵  (5.22)   𝑑𝐷𝐵
𝑑𝑡
 = (+𝜉𝐵𝑊𝐵𝐼𝑊 − 𝜂𝐵𝑊𝐵) + 𝑑𝐵𝑑𝑡  𝐷𝐵𝐵  (5.23)   𝑑𝑆𝑊
𝑑𝑡
= (−𝜉𝑊𝑆𝑊𝐼𝑊 − 𝜂𝑊𝑆𝑊𝑅𝑊) (5.24)   𝑑𝐼𝑊
𝑑𝑡
 = (+𝜉𝑊𝐼𝑊 𝑆𝑊 − 𝜂𝑊𝐼𝑊𝑅𝑊) (5.25)   𝑑𝑅𝑊
𝑑𝑡
= (+𝜂𝑊𝑅𝑊𝑆𝑊 + 𝜂𝑊𝑅𝑊𝐼𝑊) (5.26) 
 
Use of white population is the cheapest and the most common way conduct a cyber 
attack. Also, there are a few recent incidents in real world that shows these types of 
attacks can be used with a kinetic attack (before or after a kinetic battle starts). Modeling 
this phenomenon is an area of interest, and the models that discussed in Chapter IV can be 
modified in various ways for further research. We propose one way, to open this path for 
the discussions, but adding different attributes and modeling different phases may be 
necessary along with using these models on real world data. 
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6. Smart Cyber Ammunition Attack 
This section introduces a smart cyber ammunition attack model. Unlike previous 
models, a smart cyber ammunition attack can be used to kinetically damage a cyber-aimed 
target. In this model, Red does not have cyber capability, and Blue conducts a smart cyber 
ammunition attack by using two different types of infections on Red. Consider these two 
infections as the moving parts of a cyber weapon, which only works together. So, they 
spread in stealth and do not affect the infected unit’s kinetic capability. In this case for 
Red, a unit is disabled permanently (detonated) with a rate, which is the detonation rate 
referred as δ, when two infections (𝐼1 and 𝐼2) collide on the same unit at the same time. So, 
if a unit is infected with one of these infections, then two options appear: it would be 
cured for good, or it will have the other infection and detonate with a rate. These 
infections do not have any effects otherwise, and a patch for one infection does not limit 
the other infection.  
To create a smart cyber ammunition, using two different types of infections may 
be essential, because a supply chain attack would be conducted. It means that if the cyber 
attacker (Blue here) uses one type of infection, every time infected part is used in a 
machine (aimed or not), it will be detonated with a rate, which may cause unwanted 
damage. However, using two types of infections for two different parts would limit the 
risk to cause an unwanted damage to a very low level (maybe insignificant). In other 
words, Blue may not be able to find a part used in just (aimed) Red units, but may be able 
to find two parts that can just be used on aimed units together, and detonate aimed Red 
units with a cyber attack using two infections that spread on these two parts . 
Since this is a stealth weapon, a lower detonation rate helps to hide the infected 
parts. In other words, if we set δ to .99, each time these two parts used together, there is a 
.99 chance to cause a cyber attack. However, this may not be desirable if the intention is to 
confuse the users of these parts. It would be an obvious evidence if the cyber weapon 
activates each time these two parts are used together, so we want to randomize that 
process and choose a probability to activate these infections depending on the tactical 
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approach. If Blue keeps the detonation rate low, it will cause Red to use less resources 
about cyber protection (e.g., 𝜂1, 𝜂2 ≅ 0) and will help to spread these infections easier. 
 












 = −𝛿 𝐼1 𝐼2 (5.27)   𝑑𝐵
𝑑𝑡
=  −𝜌 𝑍   (5.28)   𝑑𝑍𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑐
𝑑𝑡
=  −𝛽 𝐵 (5.29)   𝑑𝑆1
𝑑𝑡
= (−𝜉1𝑆1𝐼1 − 𝜂1𝑆1𝑅1) + 𝑑𝑍𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑑𝑡  𝑆1𝑍  (5.30)   𝑑𝐼1
𝑑𝑡
 = (+𝜉1𝐼1𝑆1 − 𝜂1𝐼1𝑅1) + 𝑑𝑍𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑑𝑡  𝐼1𝑍 + 𝑑𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑡  (5.31)   𝑑𝑅1
𝑑𝑡
= (+𝜂1𝑅1𝑆1 + 𝜂1𝑅1𝐼1) + 𝑑𝑍𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑑𝑡 𝑅1𝑍  (5.32)   𝑑𝑆2
𝑑𝑡
= (−𝜉2𝑆2𝐼2 − 𝜂2𝑆2𝑅2) + 𝑑𝑍𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑑𝑡  𝑆2𝑍  (5.33)   𝑑𝐼2
𝑑𝑡
 = (+𝜉2𝐼2 𝑆2 − 𝜂2𝐼2 𝑅2) + 𝑑𝑍𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑑𝑡  𝐼2𝑍 + 𝑑𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑡  (5.34)   𝑑𝑅2
𝑑𝑡
= (+𝜂2𝑅2𝑆2 + 𝜂2𝑅2𝐼2) + 𝑑𝑍𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑑𝑡 𝑅2𝑍  (5.35) 
 
We see a new concept in cyber attack in this case. The cyber attacker causes 
kinetic damage on the adversary with only using cyber force. Since there are some 
incidents like this in real world, this concept is in an area of interest. The proposed model, 
however, is just a glimpse on the topic, which has a variety of aspects and ways to model, 
and needs detailed discussions. 
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B. TIMELINE LIMITATIONS FOR PARAMETERS 
In Figure 38, we summarize a cyber attack process on a timeline. Each parameter 
models different types of effects on different phases of the process. Red labels are the 
attack phases for the cyber attacker, and blue labels are the defensive phases for the cyber 
defender. These phases are discussed in Appendix B in detail. Peace represents the period 
before and after a cyber attack, the phase without cyber considerations. Access represents 
the action of infiltration to the system, by injecting the first infection (I=1). The time 
between these two phases is considered as 𝑡1, which includes reconnaissance, gathering 
information and conducting intrusion techniques. Escalation represents the period after the 
intrusion, until the Assault. This phase is considered as 𝑡2 + 𝑡3. Assault represents the 
action when cyber attack affects kinetic world, which may be a process (from 𝑡1 to the end 
of the battle) or a shock (when the infected ratio is at a desired level). Escalation phase is 
considered in two parts as from the side of defender. 𝑡2 which is the period until the cyber 
defender detects the vulnerability, and 𝑡3 which is the period until the defender publishes a 
patch. Then the recovered units start to work until the cyber battle is over, which is the 
period represented as 𝑡4. The introduced terms are represented in the timeline, to be more 
specific about where we can start using these parameters within a cyber attack scheme.  
The time phases are explicitly mentioned because although the model in Chapter 
IV covers 𝑡4, a cyber attack needs a larger period of time. The proposed extensions are one 
way to represent and explore these phases,  
Now consider that we have some limited resource, and we allocate this to decrease 
some of these phases. So, “How does increasing intrusion time affect the cyber attack?” or 
“What is the effect of detecting vulnerability earlier?” are questions of interest, but we 
limit the scope of this study to 𝑡4 and the effects of Assault considering infection 




 The range of parameters in a cyber attack. Figure 38. 
 
C. NON-SCALED CYBER TIME – KINETIC COMBAT TIME 
In this part, we will explore two types of cyber situations which cause instant 
effects on kinetic battle. For these two cases, we do not need to go into detail and estimate 
infection spread rates or numbers. The reason is that the outcome for kinetic battle would 
be the same, and regardless of spread, we can assume that the attack rate drops down from 
βU to βD instantly, after a certain point. 
The first case is about the effects of infection spread and patch rates, which may 
cause to dominate cyber battle or kinetic battle The second case is about the effect of a 




1. High Spread Rates and Patch Rates 
We will use the time scale from Schramm and Gaver (2013) as a reference point to 
separate the cases in which cyber effects such as spread rates (i.e., 𝜉) are too fast and 
affect the kinetic battle instantaneously. In the same manner, cyber effects can be too 
small and ineffective if the patch rates (i.e., 𝜂) are too fast. There are two possible 
outcomes: 
 
First case is when the condition discussed in Schramm and Gaver (2013) holds: 
 𝑆02 𝜉𝐵 (𝛽𝑈 − 𝛽𝐷) ≫ 4 𝛽𝑈 𝑍02 ?̅? . (5.36) 
This means too fast cyber time for the kinetic battle. So, in case of a shock, cyber 
operation result is effective by 𝑡∗ on kinetic battle. The result of this attack depends on one 
condition. The condition is: 
η𝐵  ≪   𝜉𝐵 . 
That means the infection has too high spread rate, and at time 𝑡∗ attack rate will 
change to 𝛽𝐷 This causes a shock effect as described in Chapter III. 
Or the other way, the condition does not hold, 
𝜂𝐵 ≫   𝜉𝐵 . 
Meaning that the patch rates are too high for the infection to spread (or survive), so 
at time  𝑡∗ attack rate does not change from 𝛽𝑈, and the cyber attack has no effect on 
kinetic battle. 
 
Second case is when the discussed condition (5.36) does not hold: 
𝑆0
2 𝜉𝐵 (𝛽𝑈 − 𝛽𝐷) ≪ 4 𝛽𝑈 𝑍02 ?̅? . 
 
This means too slow cyber time for the kinetic battle. In other words, kinetic battle 
will be ended, long before cyber attack has an effect on the battle. So, in this case cyber 
operation result is not effective on kinetic battle.  
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2. Single Critical Cyber Target  
The second case which may cause an instant effect is when the force under cyber 
attack (Blue) has a crucial target that gathers and controls most of the cyber movements, 
which creates a natural bottleneck for cyber infrastructure. In this case, the spread in other 
units can be ineffective, but infection of these bottlenecks can affect a whole network. 
Although these devices are secured with more protection layers than ordinary units, the 
protection level never goes to 100%, and infection of these units may even be disastrous 
for defenders. In these cases, headquarters main command and control devices, main 
communication servers, fire control and flight sync units, etc., can be possible targets. 
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VI. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
We provide an overall summary of the thesis, followed by some insights derived in 
this study, including recommendations, which may help to support decision makers in an 
analytic approach. Future research combines some topics in a sequence that will help to 
improve and validate the results of this study, and extend the range of use.  
A. SUMMARY 
In cases involving cyber incidents there is an unexpected impact, both in business 
and the military. The importance of cyber operations and cyber defensive measures are not 
just some buzzwords, as recently evidenced by the U.S. establishment of its first official 
“Cyber Force,” and stated cyberspace as a main domain for military operations along with 
land, air, sea and space.  
This thesis is motivated by the need to understand analytically the effects of cyber 
warfare on real battles. We extend two recently published models that use Lanchester 
equations as a primary model for combat. Our extension of the model by Schramm (2012), 
Lanchester with discontinuities, can be used to model physical attacks, supply chain 
attacks or DDoS attacks, all of which can have discontinuous impacts on combat. The 
second model of Schramm and Gaver (2013), the mixed epidemic combat model, can be 
used to represent viral and malware attacks, along with special designed cyber tools. The 
impacts of these attack concepts can be gradual or continuous, but can turn into a shock 
effect with some tactical arrangements such as event or time triggers.  
Our objective is to answer questions about the impact of cyber operations on 
kinetic battle. Exploring some analytical and numerical results in this pursuit, we consider 
tradeoffs between the model parameters to answer questions like “what is the value of a 
cyber unit?,” “how much time does the defender have, to recover to not to lose?,” or “if 
one side faces a larger force, what are the cyber requirements to overcome that 
advantage.” Various special cases depict the effects of battlefield capabilities, kinetic and 
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cyber. Cyber capability can potentially diminish the attack power of an opponent for an 
arbitrary but decisive time. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The results from the shock cyber model suggest the following measures to reduce 
the expected loss value due to a cyber attack. 
First, use distributed networks, each in control of a limited number of units, or use 
cloud networking, if applicable. As the force size which is susceptible to an infection gets 
larger, the loss from the cyber attack will get larger. So the cyber effects use similar 
mechanics as with Lanchester square law force concentration rule. But unlike 
conventional kinetic battles, for a cyber attacker it is easier to cause damage to, and defeat 
a larger force compared to defeating two smaller forces. 
Secondly, defensively delay the opponent cyber attack as much as possible. If the 
cyber attack shock can be delayed from time t to time 2t, the effect of the cyber attack 
reduces to ~ ¼ of the cyber effect at time t. 
Thirdly, defensively shorten the recovery time from a cyber attack, because the 
duration of the cyber attack increases the effects of that attack. If the duration of the cyber 
effect at time t halves, the damage by cyber attack can be reduced to ¼ of that at time t.  
The damage caused by the cyber attack depends on its effectiveness: reduction of 
adversarial kinetic capability. The effectiveness of the attack can be reduced by increasing 
the resilience of cyber systems, such as by having trusted system backup points, 
rehearsing system resetting to a backup point, suitably frequent scans for probable 
intrusions, along with logging and inspecting network traffic. If the attack is not very 
effective, the defender may even choose not to allocate any resources to recover from it. 
Results from the continuous cyber effects model suggest the following measures to 
mitigate a cyber attack. 
First, prevent successful attacks by decreasing intrusion rates, establishing security 
layers, training for cyber-awareness, etc. We know that to allocate resources we need more 
detail for these types of recommendations, because the defensive costs for cyber are higher 
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than to attack opponent. Analytical and numerical examples show that defensive actions 
may be more effective than offensive actions in cyber operations. We provide tools to 
compare and analyze these tradeoffs.  
For instance, it is better to conduct five intrusions, each infecting one unit in the 
adversary system in different times, than it is to conduct one intrusion and infect five units 
at that time, assuming that all are using the same infection. 
Secondly, keeping a high fraction of the force in the recovered state is as important 
as having a high patch rate. If a force can keep the cyber security of its units updated, the 
starting conditions will be in favor of the defender, and the cyber attack can be stopped 
before it becomes a pandemic. 
These insights may differ for specific zero day vulnerabilities. For cases in which 
the attacker takes the risk of being intercepted, it may be better to wait to for a promising 
level of infected units or for the discovery of a defender vulnerability to launch a cyber 
attack. The above phenomenon is not currently captured in the models, but is a strong 
candidate for future work 
C.  FURTHER RESEARCH 
We are at the very beginning of modeling coordinated cyber and kinetic 
phenomena. Academic literature on this topic is still fairly young. Since there are various 
ways to use and extend the models in this study, we have started from basics. In this 
context, future work can be focused on exploring proposed extensions, or adopting 
different infection spread systems. A more detailed study is needed to explore other types 
of cyber attacks. Adding stochasticity to studied models and validating proposed models 
with real world data are two main courses for further research.  
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APPENDIX A.  DEFINITION OF TERMS 
These are the term definitions published, or commonly accepted, and generally 
used with the same meaning outside of this study. We refer to military documents 
regarding the purpose of the study. 
 
Navigation warfare: Deliberate defensive and offensive action to assure and prevent 
positioning, navigation, and timing information through coordinated employment of 
space, cyberspace, and electronic warfare operations. Also called NAVWAR. (JP-3-14) 
 
Offensive cyberspace operations: Cyberspace operations intended to project power by the 
application of force in or through cyberspace. Also called OCO. (JP 3–12) 
 
Cyber Capability: Any device or software payload intended to disrupt, deny, degrade, 
negate, impair or destroy adversarial computer systems, data, activities or capabilities. 
Cyber capabilities do not include a device or software that is solely intended to provide 
access to an adversarial computer system for data exploitation. (AFI 51–402) 
 
Cyberspace Operations: A cyberspace operation is the employment of cyber capabilities 
where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace. Such 
operations include computer network operations and activities to operate and defend the 
Global Information Grid. (AFI 51–402) 
 
Computer Network Exploitation (CNE): Enabling operations and intelligence collection 
capabilities conducted through the use of computer networks to gather data from target or 
adversary automated information systems or networks. (Joint Pub 3–13) 
 
Cyber (adj.): Of or pertaining to the cyberspace environment, capabilities, plans, or 
operations. (Air Force definition) 
 
Cyber Capability: Any device or software payload intended to disrupt, deny, degrade, 
negate, impair, or destroy adversarial computer systems, data, activities, or capabilities. 
Cyber capabilities do not include a device or software that is solely intended to provide 
access to an adversarial computer system for data exploitation. (AFI 51–402) 
 
Cyberspace: A global domain within the information environment consisting of the 
interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, 
telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and 
controllers. (Joint Pub 1–02)  
 
Cyberspace Operations: The employment of cyber capabilities where the primary purpose 
is to achieve military objectives or effects in or through cyberspace. (Joint Pub 3–0) 
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Cyberspace Superiority: The operational advantage in, through, and from cyberspace to 
conduct operations at a given time and in a given domain without prohibitive interference. 
(AFDD 3–12) 
 
Cyberspace Support: Foundational, continuous, or responsive operations in order to ensure 
information integrity and availability in, through, or from Air Force controlled 
infrastructure and its interconnected analog and digital portion of the battle space. (AFDD 
3–12) 
 
Defensive Cyberspace Operations (DCO): DCO direct and synchronize actions to detect, 
analyze, counter, and mitigate cyber threats and vulnerabilities; outmaneuver adversaries 
taking or about to take offensive actions; and otherwise protect critical missions that 
enable our freedom of action in cyberspace. (USCYBERCOM Concept of Operations, v 
1.0, 21 Sep 2010) 
 
Defensive Cyberspace Operations (DCO): DCO direct and synchronize actions to detect, 
analyze, counter, and mitigate cyber threats and vulnerabilities; outmaneuver adversaries 
taking or about to take offensive actions; and otherwise protect critical missions that 
enable our freedom of action in cyberspace. (USCYBERCOM Concept of Operations, v 
1.0, 21 Sep 2010) 
 
Global Information Grid (GIG): The globally interconnected, end-to-end set of 
information capabilities, associated processes and personnel for collecting, processing, 
storing, disseminating, and managing information on demand to warfighters, policy 
makers, and support personnel. The GIG includes owned and leased communications and 
computing systems and services, software (including applications), data, security services, 
other associated services, and National Security Systems. (Joint Pub 6–0) 
 
Information Assurance (IA): Measures that protect and defend information and 
information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, 
confidentiality, and non-repudiation. This includes providing for restoration of 
information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities. 
(AFPD 33–2, Joint Pub 3–13) 
 
Information Superiority: The operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, 
process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying 
an adversary’s ability to do the same. (Joint Pub 3–13) 
 
Offensive Cyberspace Operations (OCO): The creation of various enabling and attack 
effects in cyberspace, to meet or support national and combatant commanders’ objectives 
and actively defend DOD or other information networks, as directed. (USCYBERCOM 
Concept of Operations, v 1.0, 21 Sep 2010) 
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APPENDIX B.  MODEL ENVIRONMENT 
In this section, we describe the terms and the concept of cyber operations. 
Although these types of operations widely vary by nature, we use the most general form 
and explain the cyber warfare by phases agreed upon. 
Asymmetric Threat 
According to the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (JP1-02), 
asymmetric means: “In military operations the application of dissimilar strategies, tactics, 
capabilities, and methods to circumvent or negate an opponent’s strengths while 
exploiting his weaknesses.” The term asymmetric threat is used when the threat has the 
potential to cause damage at an extraordinary ratio to its effort. Effort can be quantified by 
its cost, information requirement, manpower, access to resources etc. In those terms, 
terrorist attacks like suicide bombs, IED/mine threats, guerilla attacks are types of 
asymmetric threats.  
We can categorize cyber threat as an asymmetric threat, because of its impact 
regarding its effort. In cyberspace, even one person with proper skills and interest can 
become a national threat. It is easy to cause a national disaster with an organized cyber 
attempt. When this effect is joined with kinetic effects in battle, its multiplicative effect 
will boost the attacking force.  
Cyber Environment 
Anything related to electronic devices can be affected by cyber operations. In other 
words, we would be immune to a cyber operation if we were to use a bow to hunt, and 
only use candle light at night. But, as was stated before, anything electronic or related to 
electronics can be affected by a cyber operation. 
Cyber Forces 
A cyber operation typically consists of the following elements: 
• Specific equipment: Such as computers, data connectors, input devices. 
• Specialized personnel: At least one person with knowledge and training 
about cyber operations. This person can write autonomous programs, which 
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are able to work independently, but we need a code-writer before that code 
copies itself.   
• Physical contact: Even with specific equipment and specialized personnel, 
we may not be able to conduct a cyber operation. We may need a physical 
contact with the target network and special equipment. All data transfer 
assets including electromagnetic spectrum and supply chain intrusion can 
provide this contact. 
We assume these three requirements are physical necessities.  
We can categorize the cyber operational forces into two groups as Human 
Controlled Program (HCP) and Automated Program (AP). Both these groups need to 
satisfy physical requirements and are categorized by working process. We use APs in this 
study as a cyber threat, because it is more commonly used in larger cyber environments, 
and HCP works like the APs in the beginning. HCP is used in cyber operations for special 
units, which is not in our focus in this study. We ignore human-related concerns behind 
APs, such as training level or communication skill, and just focus on the product AP, as it 
can work independently. 
Non-combatant units, units which do not have any offensive or defensive assets, 
can be categorized as white population. But, even white units can be controlled with any 
of the fighting forces without approval (or notice) of the white user, and can be used as a 
reserve. 
Cyber Weapons 
Cyber weapons are special programs (tools) used as weapons in cyberspace. A 
human may or may not be necessary to use this tool, meaning that tools can be trigger 
activated, or pre-programmed, or use basic artificial intelligence. Also, any program can 
be equipped with disguised tools and can be weaponized. 
Objectives of Cyber Operations 
After regulations made in 2010 concerning cyber forces (Lynn, 2010), we assume 
that the cyber domain is another front in a kinetic combat, one which requires strategy, 
resources and tactics. Although cyber operations may have a variety of objectives, such as 
stealing information, locking data (ransomware), changing data, destroying data, slowing 
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down communications, slowing down systems and information propagation, etc., we focus 
on slowing down communications and/or system operations.  
Phases of Cyber Operations 
We can generalize the cyber operation phases by using the attack phases. The 







• Sustain, and 
• Obfuscate.( Winterfeld and Andress, 2012).  
 
Tasks of Cyber Operations 
Cyber operations can be tasked in various ways. These operations may be limited 
to cyber space, as well as extending to physical environments. A cyber force can do each 
of the tasks below to critical data or software, which indirectly affects adversary. Also, 
these tasks can be used for direct attacks in order to shut down electric sources and grids, 
communication lines, production assets, disrupt or change control measurements to cause 
a critical or fatal fault on mechanical or even nuclear parts etc… 
Programs can execute tasks such as: 
• Attack,  
• Block,  
• Delay,  
• Disrupt,  
• Destroy,  
• Isolate,  
• Screen, and 
• Withdraw.  
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Types of Cyber Attacks 
Cyber attacks can be categorized in two main parts: Logical cyber attacks and 
Physical cyber attacks (Andress and Winterfeld, 2013). 
Logical cyber attacks use: 
• Recon tools, 
• Scan tools, 
• Access and escalation tools, 
• Exfiltration tools, 
• Assault tools, and 
• Obfuscation tools. 
 
Physical cyber attacks use: 
• Supply chain attack tools, and 
• SCADA (Infrastructure) attack tools. 
Each type of attack uses different attributes of cyber environments, and should be 
modeled separately. So we introduce different models for different attack types. 
In our models, we use the fact that the effect of a cyber attack starts with the 
Access phase. Recon – Scan phases just supply intelligence for further phases. Also, the 
damage happens in the Assault phase, where the action happens. The Escalate phase 
expands the reach of attack as much as possible, whereas the Exfiltrate phase limits the 
reach in order to adjust the focus on the right target. Sustain – Obfuscate phases are about 
erasing any trails to prevent backtrack. 
In order to model a realistic scenario, we can simplify these phases into three as: 
Access, Escalate and Assault. In this case we assume that Recon and Scan phases were 
completed before, and we assume no evidence of the phases remains..   
In this context, for any type of cyber attacks (including web defacement attacks, 
DOS attacks, zero-day attacks, malicious code attacks…) for a closed network as a 
military network, malicious code needs to be used for access, escalate, or assault phases. 
We use epidemiology to model cyber infection for these three phases. 
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APPENDIX C.  EXPLORING EPIDEMIC COMBAT MODEL 
1. Steps to Dynamic State Equations 
 
The original equations from Schramm and Gaver (2013), as a one-sided model 
specified in (4.1) - (4.4): 
𝑑𝑍
𝑑𝑡
= − 𝛽𝑈(𝑆 + 𝑅) − 𝛽𝐷 (𝐼) , 
𝑑𝑆
𝑑𝑡
= (−𝜉 𝑆 𝐼 − 𝜂 𝑆 𝑅) −  𝜌 𝑍 𝑆
𝑆 + 𝐼 + 𝑅 , 
𝑑𝐼
𝑑𝑡
 = (𝜉 𝐼 𝑆 − 𝜂 𝐼 𝑅) −  𝜌 𝑍 𝐼
𝑆 + 𝐼 + 𝑅 , 
𝑑𝑅
𝑑𝑡
= (𝜂 𝑆 𝑅 + 𝜂 𝑅 𝐼) −  𝜌 𝑍 𝑅
𝑆 + 𝐼 + 𝑅 . 
 
We modify this one sided model to two sided by adding the cyber effect to both sides 




= (−𝜉𝐵𝑆𝐵𝐼𝐵 − 𝜂𝐵𝑆𝐵𝑅𝐵) − [𝜌𝑈(𝑆𝑍 + 𝑅𝑍) + 𝜌𝐷 (𝐼𝑍)] 𝑆𝐵𝑆𝐵 + 𝐼𝐵 + 𝑅𝐵 
𝑑𝐼𝐵
𝑑𝑡
 = (+𝜉𝐵𝐼𝐵𝑆𝐵 − 𝜂𝐵𝐼𝐵𝑅𝐵) − [𝜌𝑈(𝑆𝑍 + 𝑅𝑍) + 𝜌𝐷 (𝐼𝑍)] 𝐼𝐵𝑆𝐵 + 𝐼𝐵 + 𝑅𝐵 
𝑑𝑅𝐵
𝑑𝑡
= (+𝜂𝐵𝑅𝐵𝑆𝐵 + 𝜂𝐵𝑅𝐵𝐼𝐵) − [𝜌𝑈(𝑆𝑍 + 𝑅𝑍) + 𝜌𝐷 (𝐼𝑍)] 𝑅𝐵𝑆𝐵 + 𝐼𝐵 + 𝑅𝐵 
𝑑𝑆𝑍
𝑑𝑡
= (−𝜉𝑍𝑆𝑍𝐼𝑍 − 𝜂𝑍𝑆𝑍𝑅𝑍)  − [ 𝛽𝑈(𝑆𝐵 + 𝑅𝐵) + 𝛽𝐷 (𝐼𝐵)] 𝑆𝑧𝑆𝑍 + 𝐼𝑍 + 𝑅𝑍 
𝑑𝐼𝑍
𝑑𝑡
 = (+𝜉𝑍𝐼𝑍 𝑆𝑍 − 𝜂𝑍𝐼𝑍 𝑅𝑍) − [ 𝛽𝑈(𝑆𝐵 + 𝑅𝐵) + 𝛽𝐷 (𝐼𝐵)] 𝐼𝑧𝑆𝑍 + 𝐼𝑍 + 𝑅𝑍 
𝑑𝑅𝑍
𝑑𝑡




 We define in Section IV.A that   
𝑆𝐵 + 𝐼𝐵 + 𝑅𝐵 = 𝐵  
𝑆𝑍 + 𝐼𝑍 + 𝑅𝑍 = 𝑍  
 
 We define in (4.11) and (4.12) that: d𝐵d𝑡 =  −𝜌𝑈(𝑆𝑍 + 𝑅𝑍) − 𝜌𝐷 (𝐼𝑍) , d𝑍d𝑡 =  − 𝛽𝑈(𝑆𝐵 + 𝑅𝐵) − 𝛽𝐷 (𝐼𝐵) , 
 
 We define in (4.21) and (4.22) that: d𝐵d𝑡 =  −ρ� 𝑍  , d𝑍d𝑡 =  −β� 𝐵  , 
 









We use the form as in (4.13) - (4.18) to manipulate the equations on one side:  d𝑆𝐵d𝑡 = (−𝜉𝐵𝑆𝐵𝐼𝐵 − 𝜂𝐵𝑆𝐵𝑅𝐵) + d𝐵d𝑡  𝑆𝐵𝐵 , d𝐼𝐵d𝑡  = (+𝜉𝐵𝐼𝐵𝑆𝐵 − 𝜂𝐵𝐼𝐵𝑅𝐵) + d𝐵d𝑡  𝐼𝐵𝐵 , d𝑅𝐵d𝑡 = (+𝜂𝐵𝑅𝐵𝑆𝐵 + 𝜂𝐵𝑅𝐵𝐼𝐵) + d𝐵d𝑡 𝑅𝐵𝐵  , d𝑆𝑍d𝑡 = (−𝜉𝑍𝑆𝑍𝐼𝑍 − 𝜂𝑍𝑆𝑍𝑅𝑍) + d𝑍d𝑡  𝑆𝑧𝑍  , d𝐼𝑍d𝑡  = (+𝜉𝑍𝐼𝑍 𝑆𝑍 − 𝜂𝑍𝐼𝑍 𝑅𝑍) + d𝑍d𝑡  𝐼𝑧𝑍  , d𝑅𝑍d𝑡 = (+𝜂𝑍𝑅𝑍𝑆𝑍 + 𝜂𝑍𝑅𝑍𝐼𝑍) + d𝑍d𝑡 𝑅𝑧𝑍  . 
 












= (+𝜂𝐵𝑅𝐵𝑆𝐵 + 𝜂𝐵𝑅𝐵𝐼𝐵) + 𝑑𝐵𝑑𝑡 𝑅𝐵𝐵 . 
 
 Note that from here we refer to initial states of Blue with representation 
(S0, I0, R0). These equations are not equivalent to six equations in (4.5) - (4.10). 

















𝑑𝐵 = (+𝜂𝐵𝑆𝐵 + 𝜂𝐵𝐼𝐵) 𝑑𝑡 (5.39) 
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𝑑𝑆𝐵 −  1𝐼𝐵 𝑑𝐼𝐵 = −𝜉𝐵(𝐼𝐵 + 𝑆𝐵) 𝑑𝑡 (5.40) 
 







𝑑𝐵 = +𝜂𝐵(𝑆𝐵 + 𝐼𝐵) 𝑑𝑡 (5.41) 
 
By dividing (5.40) by (5.41): 1
𝑆𝐵





= −𝜉𝐵 (𝐼𝐵 + 𝑆𝐵) 𝑑𝑡+𝜂𝐵 (𝑆𝐵 + 𝐼𝐵) 𝑑𝑡 
 




𝑑𝑆𝐵 −  1𝐼𝐵 𝑑𝐼𝐵 = − 𝜉𝐵 𝜂𝐵 ( 1𝑅𝐵 𝑑𝑅𝐵 − 1𝐵 𝑑𝐵) (5.42) 
 
By integrating both sides in (5.42), we derive the equation: 
𝑙𝑛 (𝑆𝐵
𝐼𝐵
) −  𝑙𝑛 (𝑆0
𝐼0
) = − 𝜉𝐵 
𝜂𝐵 (𝑙𝑛 (𝑅𝐵𝐵 ) − 𝑙𝑛 (𝑅0𝐵0)) 
 
Which leads to: 
−𝑙𝑛 (𝑆𝐵𝐼𝐵𝑆0
𝐼0
) = 𝜉𝐵 
















We can simplify the equation for Blue as: 
  𝐼𝐵𝐼0     𝑆𝐵𝑆0   = �
   𝑅𝐵𝑅0      𝐵𝐵0  �
𝜉
𝜂�    (5.43) 
 


































Note that all initial states S0, I0, R0, parameters 𝜉, 𝜂 belong to B, and c is constant. 
These calculations were represented for Blue side only, but can be calculated for Red side, 
also. 
Consider the case for “no kinetic battle” or “no attrition” and spread rate equals to 
patch rate. In that case, 𝐵
𝐵0








which is a different representation of Schramm and Gaver (2013) for closed form 
of I(t), which uses the same assumptions. 
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D. Approximation Calculations to Estimate Cyber Operation Value 
 
1. Scaled Cyber Time – Kinetic Combat Time  
We used the equations ?̅? =  𝛽𝑈 − 𝐼𝐵𝛼  (𝛽𝑈 − 𝛽𝐷)  and   ?̅? = 𝜌𝑈 − 𝐼𝑍𝛼(𝜌𝑈 −  𝜌𝐷) for 
variable attack rates. Figure 26 shows how the attack rates may change by time when 
cyber effects are considered. Using these rates as functions of time will give us the exact 
solution, but give us a hard time to solve for. To simplify the process, we can approximate 
the result by using a constant average number of attack rates. Note that using a constant 
average attack rate instead of calculating whole process may be misleading, because we 
simply ignore the variability of the process and try to overcome a dynamic process by 
using two constant numbers. However, if there is enough data for the effects of these rates, 
using average numbers can be safer, and will allow us to implement different types of 
dynamic models into large simulation models, which are used in military decision making.  
Here we show a notional simplified example by comparing two battles; in Figure 
39 both sides have cyber capabilities, and one side (Blue) is using kinetic attack, affected 
dynamically, and in Figure 40 we model the same battle with a constant kinetic attack rate. 
Note that changing the parameters will change the situation, and the constant attack rate 
should be re-evaluated. These average attack rates will approximate to real battle results, 




 Force levels in numerical experiment Figure 39. 




 Force levels in using average approximation Figure 40. 
(?̅? = 0.075) 
 
 
2. Different Types of Models 
 
We used epidemic models and kinetic combat models and combined them to 
explain the effect of cyber operations. It is important to point out that the infection term in 
epidemic model was used to demonstrate cyber effects in a battle in this study, but in fact 
this term can be used in different ways.  
The term “Infection” used in this study is a broad term which can be used for any 
effect that reduces a force’s warfighting capabilities. The scope of examples can be as 
broad as, propaganda via media which affects a force psychologically, chemical or 
biological weapons which affects a force biologically, terror actions which damage 
infrastructure etc.; basically all kinds of asymmetric threats. The scenario in this thesis 
considers malware infection on electronic devices, but the model can be used in much 
broader cases. 
 103 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 104 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Adams, J. 2013. March 2000, Testimony of James Adams, Chief Executive Officer 
Infrastructure Defense, Inc. to Committee on Governmental Affairs United States 
Senate. http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/?id=57137fee-272b-4700-afb2-
302231a11d81. Accessed March 11 . 
Andress, J., S. Winterfeld. (2013). Cyber Warfare: Techniques, Tactics and Tools for 
Security Practitioners (2nd ed.). Syngress Publishing, Waltham, MA. 
Chen, Z., C. Chen. 2008. Deriving a closed-form expression for worm-scanning strategies. 
International Journal of Security and Networks, 4(3), 135–144. 
Cigital. 2013. President Obama Acknowledges Cyber Threat and Signs Executive Order 
for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity. Cigital Online. 
http://www.cigital.com/justice-league-blog/2013/02/13/president-obama-
acknowledges-cyber-threat-and-signs-executive-order/. 
Decker, B., W. C. Douglass, II. 2011. Bowing to Beijing: How Barack Obama Is 
Hastening America’s Decline and Ushering ina Century of Chinese Domination. 
Regnery Publishing, Washington, DC. 
Defense Science Board. 2013.Task Force Report: Resilient Military Systems Cyber 
Threat,http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ResilientMilitarySystems.CyberThreat.
pdf (October 10). 
The Economist. 2010. Cyberwar: War in the fifth domain. The Economist. Online edition 
(July 1). 
Engel, J. H., 1954. A verification of Lanchester’s law. Journal of the Operations Research 
Society of America 2 163‒171. 
Gonsalves, A. 2012. Bank attackers more sophisticated than typical hacktivists, expert 
says. CSO Online - Security and Risk. 
http://www.csoonline.com/article/2132319/malware-cybercrime/bank-attackers-
more-sophisticated-than-typical-hacktivists--expert-says.html 
Grant, R. 1999. Airpower made it work. Air Force Magazine 82 30‒37. 
Hancock, B. 1999. Security view. Comput. Secur. 18 553‒564. 
Hartley, D. S. 2001. Predicting combat effects, 1, INFORMS, Linthicum Md (2001). 
Ihaka, R., & Gentleman, R. (1996). R: a language for data analysis and graphics. Journal 
of computational and graphical statistics, 5(3), 299–314. 
 
 105 
Jones, J. H. (2007). Notes on R0. Department of Anthropological Sciences Stanford 
University. http://www.stanford.edu/~jhj1/teachingdocs/Jones-on-R0.pdf  
 
Kermack, W., A. McKendrick. 1927. Contributions to the mathematical theory of 
epidemics—I. Bulletin of Mathematical Biology (1991) 53(1–2), 33–55. 
Lanchester, F. W. 1916. Aircraft in warfare: the dawn of the fourth arm. Constable 
limited, Appleton, NY. 
Lucas, T. W. 2000. The stochastic versus deterministic argument for combat simulations: 
Tales of when the average won’t do. Mil. Oper. Res. 5, 9‒28. 
Lynn, W. J., III. 2010. Defending a new domain. Foreign Affairs 89, 97‒108. 
McMorrow, D. Science of Cyber-Security. No. JSR-10-102. Mitre Corp, Mclean, VA, 
Jason Program Office, 2010. DTIC Document. 
Murray, J. D. 2002. Mathematical Biology I: An Introduction, vol. 17 of Interdisciplinary 
Applied Mathematics. Springer, New York, NY. 
Nakashima, E. 2013. Confidential report lists U.S. weapons system designs compromised 
by Chinese cyberspies. The Washington Post. Online edition (May 27). 
Newman, M. E. 2002. Spread of epidemic disease on networks. Phys. Rev. E. 66, 016128. 
Obama, B. 2013. Executive Order‒Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity. The 
White House, Washington, DC.  
Sanger, D. E. 2012. Obama order speeds up wave of cyberattacks against Iran. New York 
Times. Online edition (July 1). 
Schramm, Harrison C. “Lanchester models with discontinuities: An application to 
networked forces.” Mil. Oper. Res. 17.4 (2012), 59–68. 
Schramm, H. C., & Gaver, D. P. (2013). Lanchester for cyber: The mixed epidemic 
combat model. Naval Research Logistics (NRL), 60(7), 599–605. 
Shamah, D. 2013. Cyber espionage bug attacking Middle East but Israel untouched so far. 
The Times of Israel. Online edition (June 4). 
Singel, B. 2010. White House cyber czar: There is no cyberwar. Wired Magazine. Online 
edition (March 4). 
Soetaert, K., T. Petzoldt,  R. W. Setzer. 2010. Solving differential equations in R: Package 
deSolve. J. of Statistical Software 33 1‒25. 
Sommer, P. 2011. Reducing Systemic Cybersecurity Risk. OECD Multi-Displinary Issues. 
 106 
Symantec, 2012, Internet Security Threat Report 2011, Symantec Online, 
http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/other_resources/b-
istr_main_report_2011_21239364.en-us.pdf (April). 
Symantec, 2014, Internet Security Threat Report 2013, Symantec Online, 
http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/other_resources/b-
istr_main_report_v19_21291018.en-us.pdf (April). 
U.S. Department of Defense. 2009. Annual Report to Congress, Military Power of the 
People’s Republic of China, 22. 
U.S. Department of Defense. 2011. DOD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace.  
Van Mieghem, P., J. Omic, R. Kooij. 2009. Virus spread in networks. IEEE/ACM 
Transactions on Networking 17(1), 1‒14. 
Vojnovic, M., A. J. Ganesh. 2008. On the race of worms, alerts, and patches. IEEE/ACM 
Transactions on Networking 16(5), 1066‒1079. 
Washburn, A., M. Kress. 2009. Combat Modeling. Springer, New York. 
The White House. 2009. Cyberspace policy review: Assuring a trusted and resilient 
information and communications infrastructure. The White House, Washington, DC.  
Wiener, Norbert. Cybernetics or Control and Communication in the Animal and the 
Machine, vol. 25. MIT press, 1965. 
Winterfeld, S., J. Andress. 2012. The Basics of Cyber Warfare: Understanding the 
Fundamentals of Cyber Warfare in Theory and Practice. Newnes, Boston, MA. 
 107 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 108 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1.   Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2.   Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
 
 109 
